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1. Introduction
‘The times they are a-changin’’ is one of the lines of Bob Dylan’s classic song from the 1960s, and it 
certainly applies when it comes to how nature conservation law is currently perceived by many politicians 
and policy makers. Once, the Habitats Directive,1 with the earlier Birds Directive,2 was hailed as one of 
the cornerstones of EU environmental law and a prime example of an effective international wildlife 
law.3 Taking into account its ambitious objectives, aimed at halting the deterioration and the loss of 
the EU’s most valuable biodiversity, this enthusiasm appears more than warranted.4 Not only did the 
Habitats Directive lay down the foundations of the Natura 2000 Network, an ecological network of 
protected sites at present comprising almost 18% of the territory of the EU,5 it also required the Member 
States to implement positive management measures in these sites aimed at conserving and, if necessary, 
restoring the natural habitats and the populations of species of wild fauna and flora to a favourable 
conservation status.6 In addition, under the Habitats Directive, Member States are forced to apply a set 
of strict substantive and procedural requirements to be followed in respect of a plan or project which is 
not directly connected with or necessary for the management of a Natura 2000 site but which is likely 
to damage it.7 By promulgating a supplementary set of rules on strict species protection, which are to be 
observed throughout the Member States, the Habitats and Birds Directives moreover obliged Member 
States to outlaw destructive hunting practices and scrutinize unsustainable forms of land management 
* Hendrik Schoukens (e-mail: hendrik.schoukens@ugent.be), PhD Candidate, Department of Public International Law, Ghent University 
(Belgium).
1 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and wild fauna and flora (hereafter ‘Habitats 
Directive’), OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7.
2 Council Directive 79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild birds (Birds Directive), OJ L 103, 25.4.1979, p. 1, replaced by 
Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds (hereafter 
‘Birds Directive’), OJ L 20, 26.1.2010, p. 7.
3 G. Wandesforde-Smith & N.S.J. Watts, ‘Wildlife Conservation and Protected Areas: Politics, Procedure, and the Performance of Failure 
under the EU Birds and Habitats Directive’, 2014 Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy 17, no. 1, pp. 62-64.
4 See for more on the links between EU nature conservation law and ecological restoration: J. Verschuuren, ‘Climate Change: Rethinking 
Restoration in the European Union’s Birds and Habitats Directive’, 2010 Ecological Restoration 28, no. 4, pp. 436-438; A. Cliquet et al., 
‘Restoring nature in the EU: the only way is up?’, in C.-H. Born et al. (eds.), The Habitats Directive in its EU Environmental Law Context: 
European Nature’s Best Hope?, 2015, pp. 265-283. 
5 See: <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/> (accessed 30 November 2014).
6 Art. 6(1) Habitats Directive. 
7 See for more on the scope and recent case law in this respect: H. Schoukens, ‘The Ruling of the Court of Justice in Sweetman: How to 
Avoid a Death by a Thousand Cuts’, 2014 ELNI Review, no. 1, pp. 2-11.
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and development.8 Hence the way was paved for a more sustainable approach of the EU’s common 
natural heritage. 
However, the heyday of environmentalism is long gone. In times when most politicians are preoccupied 
with economic recovery, the discourse has profoundly changed from ambitious environmentalism to 
deregulation. As a result, the EU nature directives are increasingly seen as a relic from the past. Rather 
than being a regulatory driver for ecological restoration, the directives are currently being criticised by 
business people for exclusively focusing on tools of a prohibitive nature (‘command and control’). While 
recent research reveals that the picture of the EU nature directives as ‘rigid pieces of EU legislation’ 
capable of completely prohibiting landowners from developing their property, needs to be adjusted,9 the 
mere threat of restrictions and constraints linked to the potential presence of a protected species on a 
construction site has sparked an intense debate on the desirability of such an allegedly rigid set of nature 
assessment rules. True as it may be that only a few plans and projects have actually been cancelled on 
the basis of EU nature directives,10 the ever-growing stringent application of the restrictions contained 
in the EU nature directives in the sphere of development projects fostered considerable unease among 
business people and politicians. Over time, this criticism also found its way into legal literature, where 
doubts were cast on the effectiveness of these instruments. For instance, Kistenkas poignantly concluded 
that ‘European nature directives are said to have until now mainly focused on safeguarding habitats 
and species in situ, apparently giving Natura 2000 a rather dogmatic, reactive and ad hoc image of 
deathbed conservation or nature conservation’.11 Taking stock of recent case law developments in the 
UK, displaying a worrying degree of unwillingness amongst judges to scrutinize the merits of decisions 
in which substantive non-compliance with EU nature conservation law is alleged, other authors have 
voiced concerns about the added value of the Habitats Directive on the ground.12 
Whilst recent academic research underlines the effectiveness of preventative instruments, such as 
the Habitats and Birds Directives,13 the outlook for the EU’s biodiversity remains bleak, with only 17% 
of the habitats in a favourable conservation status. For bird species 52% is favourable.14 That, in itself, 
might not be surprising taking into account the glaring lack of proper enforcement of the EU nature 
directives in many Member States throughout the past decades. Other studies have revealed that, among 
others, the growing urbanisation is exacerbating the plight of the EU’s biodiversity, by fragmenting 
the remaining habitats and populations of many threatened species.15 A new Europe-wide study has 
indicated that, whilst some strictly protected species, such as marsh harriers and buzzards, have displayed 
some important increases in recent decades, the populations of most common species, such as house 
sparrows, starlings and skylarks, have plummeted dramatically.16 In order to reverse the negative trend, 
the European Commission’s Biodiversity Strategy to 2020 has set some ambitious policy targets.17 Not 
only is it provided there that 50% more species assessments under the Birds and Habitats Directives 
show an improved status, Target 2 adds that ‘by 2020, ecosystems and their services are maintained and 
enhanced by establishing green infrastructure and restoring at least 15% of degraded ecosystems’.18 
Obviously, stricter enforcement of the EU nature directives on the ground might lead to better 
recovery chances for some of the EU’s most threatened species. Curbing environmental degradation is 
8 See more on this topic: H. Schoukens & K. Bastmeijer, ‘Strict Species Protection in the European Union: How Strict is Strict?’ , in C.-H. Born 
et al. (eds), The Habitats Directive in its EU Environmental Law Context: European Nature’s Best Hope?, 2015, pp. 121-146.
9 See in this regard, as far as the application of the Habitats Directive in the UK is concerned: R.K.A. Morris, ‘The application of the Habitats 
Directive in the UK: Compliance or gold plating?’, 2011 Land Use Policy 28, pp. 361-369. 
10 See for more extensive information on the Dutch experiences in this regard: R. Beunen & M. Duineveld, ‘Divergence and Convergence in 
Policy Meanings of European Environmental Policies: The Case of the Birds and Habitats Directive’, 2010 International planning studies 15, 
no. 4, pp. 321-334.
11 F. Kistenkas, ‘Rethinking European Nature Conservation Legislation: Towards Sustainable Development’, 2013 Journal for European 
Environmental & Planning Law 10, no. 1, p. 83.
12 Wandesforde-Smith & Watts, supra note 3, pp. 79-80. 
13 P.F. Donalds et al., ‘International Conservation Policy Delivers Benefits for Birds in Europe’, 2007 Science 317, pp. 810-813.
14 European Environment Agency, EU 2010 biodiversity baseline, 2010, pp. 19-21.
15 European Environment Agency, Landscape fragmentation in Europe, 2011.
16 R. Inger et al., ‘Common European birds are declining rapidly while less abundant species’ numbers are rising’, 2014 Ecology Letters, 
available at <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ele.12387/full> (accessed 30 November 2014). 
17 In a similar vein: J. Verschuuren, ‘Climate Change: Rethinking Restoration in the European Union’s Birds and Habitats Directive’, 
2010 Ecological Restoration 28, no. 4, pp. 436-438. 
18 COM(2011) 244 final, OJ C 264, 8.9.2011.
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evidently pivotal in the attempts to improve environmental protection. It is widely recognized that poor 
compliance with the assessment rules throughout the decision-making process, limited participation 
and fait-accompli scenarios seriously compromise the effectiveness of the EU nature directives.19 Rather 
ironically, in the past few decades it has also become apparent that tightened compliance with nature 
protection rules might also prompt landowners for defensive management in order to avoid strict 
regulatory scrutiny.20 This was especially so in the context of the 1973 Endangered Species Act,21 which 
constitutes the cornerstone of conservation law in the United States. Throughout the nineties, some 
cases have been reported in which landowners threatened to clear-cut their property in order to prevent 
protected species from entering the area. In recent years, however, a similar trend could be detected 
in Member States like the Netherlands, a country renowned for its relatively high number of law suits 
initiated by environmental NGOs to enforce the Habitats and Birds Directive before court.22 
It might be a hasty conclusion to apply these findings to the EU as a whole. Still, in the long run, 
there is an inherent risk that the EU nature directives might also push landowners into doing exactly 
the opposite of what is good for nature. Out of fear of new restrictions on the use of their lands, the 
prescriptions included in the EU nature directives could lead to management practices aimed at 
preemptively destroying habitat to prevent protected species from occupying it in a later stage. 
In the absence of a more incentive-based approach to habitat and species conservation, protection 
rules might be counterproductive and many interesting opportunities for habitat restoration are missed 
out on. Since a significant part of the remaining biodiversity is located on private lands, such backlash 
might greatly compromise the achievement of the aforementioned biodiversity targets. Without the 
active involvement of private landowners, the recovery of many endangered European species will 
probably remain an unreachable goal for the next decades. Even through the most ambitious government 
acquisition programmes, which in most Member States primarily focus on Natura 2000 sites, only a tiny 
fraction of the ecosystems vital for the recovery of endangered species can be safeguarded. Knowing 
that the habitat of many species is primarily located outside Natura 2000 sites, additional restoration 
measures that go beyond these requirements are deemed crucial. 
Thus finding appropriate tools to stimulate restoration efforts on private lands remains vital in order 
to achieve recovery for the many threatened species in Europe. The seminal question now is: how can we 
promote voluntary nature conservation and restoration efforts on private lands outside protected areas 
without subsiding into outright curtailment of the existing protection rules? In other words, is it possible 
to ensure a high level of protection for biodiversity whilst providing additional incentives and flexibility 
for conservation practice on private lands? 
In search of answers, this paper will turn to the recent innovative regulatory approaches to nature 
conservation that have emerged in the United States, in the framework of the 1973 Endangered Species 
Act. Containing provisions on habitat and species protection similar to those that are included in the 
EU nature directives,23 the former also has become the target of an increasing body of criticism, which 
not only referred to the administrative burden that was caused but also to the perverse incentives it 
might create among landowners and project developers. Interestingly, the US Fish and Wildlife Service 
has come forward with a set of new policy tools offering promising alternatives to the command and 
control regulation in the mid-1990s. Along with the ‘No Surprises Rule’ for Habitat Conservation Plans, 
the so-called ‘Safe Harbor Agreement’ became the new environmental buzzword in the mid-1990s.24 
19 Milieu Ltd., National legislation and practices regarding the implementation of Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the 
conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, in particular Article 6, 2009, available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
document/activities/cont/200910/20091013ATT62399/20091013ATT62399EN.pdf> (accessed 30 November 2014). 
20 N. Paulich, ‘Increasing Private Conservation Through Incentive Mechanisms’, 2010 Stanford Journal of Animal Law & Policy, no. 3, p. 129.
21 16 USCA §1531 et seq. 
22 H. Woldendorp, ‘Dynamische natuur in een statische rechtsorde’, 2010 Milieu en Recht 36, no. 3, pp. 134-143; H. Schoukens, ‘Temporary 
Nature: Is European Nature Conservation Law Ready for It?’, 2011 ELNI Review, no. 2, pp. 104-116. 
23 For a comparison, see: J. Verschuuren, ‘Effectiveness of Nature Protection Legislation in the European Union and the United States: the 
Habitats Directive and the Endangered Species Act’, in M. Dieterich & J. van der Straaten (eds.), Cultural landscapes and Land Use: The 
Nature Conservation-Society Interface, 2004, pp. 39-67. 
24 See more on this topic: M.J. Bean et al., ‘Safe Harbor Agreements: Carving Out A New Role for NGOs’, 2001 Conservation Biology 
in Practice 2, no. 2, pp. 9-16; D. Kishida, ‘Safe Harbor Agreements Under the Endangered Species Act:  Are They Right for Hawai`i?’, 
2001 University of Hawaii Law Review 23, pp. 507-539. 
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Under a Safe Harbor Agreement, landowners voluntarily propose to implement restorative and habitat 
management measures aimed at the conservation of threatened species. This newly coined concept does 
offer some interesting prospects for restoration efforts on privately owned plots of land. In return for 
restoring natural habitats of endangered species, the landowner is provided with a so-called ‘safe harbor 
guarantee’, ensuring them that no additional conservation measures will be required and no additional 
land, water or resource restrictions will be imposed if the number of listed species increases as a result of 
the landowner’s actions. 
This paper takes a fresh look at this cross-cutting regulatory approach, aimed at smoother alignment 
of species protection with economic aspirations, and attempts to draw some lessons from the experiences 
in the United States. Knowing that in some EU Member States, such as the Netherlands and Belgium, 
an approach similar to Safe Harbor Agreements has emerged, a comparative approach was considered 
appropriate for the present analysis. First, we set the stage by outlining the legal framework as regards 
species protection and conservation in the United States and the EU. Then focus will shift to roots and 
origins of Safe Harbor Agreements in the context of the 1973 Endangered Species Act. This will include 
a profound evaluation of the recent practices and experiences in the United States in relation to Safe 
Harbor Agreements. This analysis will, in turn, serve as a benchmark for an evaluation of the recent 
Dutch and Belgian (Flemish) policy developments in this regard. Finally, we will address the strengths 
and weaknesses of Safe Harbor Agreements and explore to what extent this instrument, which is often 
presented as a prime example of out-of-the-box-thinking in the context of nature conservation, can 
be reconciled with the strict protection requirements set out by the Habitats Directive and the Birds 
Directive.
2. A shared history of… opposition and disincentive?
In order to fully grasp the rationale underpinning the recent shift towards innovative regulatory 
instruments addressing nature conservation, it is necessary to take a step back and briefly examine the 
coming of age of nature conservation law, both in the United States and the EU. In spite of their many 
differences, it will be revealed that, in principle, both regulatory schemes have a similar approach in 
response to the dwindling numbers of species.25 With a compelling degree of similarity, both regulatory 
instruments also fell prey to rising criticism, referring to their alleged failure to accommodate economic 
aspirations whilst protecting endangered species and their habitats. This criticism underscored the need 
for novel regulatory approaches capable of overcoming the perceived antagonism between property 
owners and land users on the one hand and nature conservation on the other hand.
2.1. The 1973 Endangered Species Act: From ‘crown jewel’ to ‘environmental pit-bull’
2.1.1. A bold move toward recovery and… the halting of large infrastructure projects?
The 1973 Endangered Species Act (ESA) was passed in order to overcome the major deficiencies of the 
1969 Endangered Species Conservation Act.26 With the enactment of the ESA a statutory framework was 
created capable of protecting species on both public and private lands in the United States. By doing so, 
the ESA distinguishes itself from other legal instruments that aim to protect landscape diversity, such 
as the Wilderness Act, the National Wildlife Refuge System and the Wild Scenic Rivers Act. The ESA’s 
clear goal was to allow the conservation of the species that were in danger of extinction. However, as was 
also the case with the EU Habitats Directive, the ESA’s main objective is not limited to preventing the 
extinction of species. It also endeavours to let a species recover to the point where it may be delisted.27 
In spite of its nearly unanimous approval, the ESA became the target of vicious criticism. By some, the 
25 See for more extensive information: Verschuuren, supra note 23, pp. 41-42. 
26 See for more extensive information: M.J. Bean, ‘Historical Background of the Endangered Species Act’, in D.C. Baur & W.R. Irvin (eds.), 
Endangered Species Act, Law, Policy and Perspectives, 2009, pp. 9-14.
27 Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. US Fish and Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004).
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ESA was described as the ‘pit-bull’ of environmental law because it is ‘short, compact, and has a hell of a 
set of teeth’.28 
The main culprits for the controversy surrounding the ESA are Sections 7 and 9. 
Under Section 7, federal agencies are required to consult with the US Fish and Wildlife Service 
(FWS) or the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to ensure that any action taken by the agency 
does not jeopardize the existence of a threatened or endangered species or cause the destruction or 
harmful modification to a listed species’ designated critical habitat.29 The notable 1978 ruling of the 
Supreme Court in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill (TVA),30 which revolved around the survival of a 
small endangered fish, the snail darter, exemplified the ‘strong teeth’ of the procedural and substantial 
obligations laid down by Section 7. The plaintiffs in this case stated that TVA’s  construction  would 
destroy critical habitat and endanger the population of snail darters. In spite of the many millions of 
dollars that had been already spent on the large-scale dam project, the Supreme Court halted the dam 
project development on the grounds of the failure to observe the ‘no jeopardy’ clause.31 
Whilst the TVA ruling created chaos and upheaval among business people and politicians, the 
strongest criticism was provoked by Section 9. This section unconditionally prohibited the ‘taking’ of 
any species listed as ‘endangered’ or ‘threatened’ under the ESA.32 By stretching the definition of ‘take’ to 
include habitat modifications that actually kill or injures listed species, by significantly impairing essential 
behavioural patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering, Section 9 could be used to restrict land 
use activities that are otherwise legal.33 The true power of the ‘take prohibition’ was first illustrated by 
the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural Resources (Palila),34 
which held that habitat destruction caused by feral sheep and goats to the habitat of the endangered 
Palila bird was a take, based on the expert testimony that continued habitat loss threatened the bird’s 
survival and recovery.35 In its notable 1995 decision in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for 
a Greater Oregon (Sweet Home) the US Supreme Court reasserted the ruling of Palila, giving Section 9 
and the corresponding definition of harm an expansive reading.36 
2.1.2. The (false?) promise of more flexibility after the 1982 amendments
Conflicts like the TVA case illustrated the inflexible nature of the ESA.37 The ESA, which at its inception 
had been hailed as the saviour of ‘the rich array of animal life with which our country has been blessed’,38 
had become increasingly unpopular among politicians. Even before the ruling of the Supreme Court 
in Sweet Home in 1995, it had dawned on many developers and landowners that the ESA can ‘act as a 
vice grip, completely prohibiting landowners from developing their property’.39 In order to overcome 
the fierce resistance among developers against Section 9’s prohibition on habitat modification, the ESA 
was thoroughly revised in 1982, to include ‘incidental take permits’ which would grant the applicant 
immunity against Section 9 take prohibitions. 
Under Section 10(a)(1)(B) of the ESA, non-federal landowners who plan activities on their lands 
that may ‘incidentally take’ a listed species may apply to the FWS or NMFS for an incidental take permit 
28 T. Egan, ‘Strongest US Environmental Law May Become Endangered Species’, N.Y. Times, May 26 1992, as cited by N. Paulich. See: Paulich, 
supra note 20, p. 116. 
29 Pursuant to Section 4 of the ESA, a critical habitat needs to be designated at the time of listing of a species or within one year. Critical 
habitat is defined as the specific geographical area that contains the physical and biological features essential to the species’ conservation 
and that may require special management or protection. 
30 437 US 153 (1978). 
31 Kishida, supra note 24, p. 508. 
32 P. Parenteau, ‘The Take Prohibition’, in Baur & Irvin (eds.), supra note 26, p. 147.
33 D.C. Baur & W.R. Irvin, ‘Overview’, in Baur & Irvin (eds.), supra note 26, p. 5. 
34 Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t of Land & Nat. Res., 639 F2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981). 
35 See for more extensive information: S.P. Quarles & T.R. Lundquist, ‘Land Use Activities and the Section 9 Take Prohibition’, in Baur & Irvin 
(eds.), supra note 26, pp. 160-191; S.G. Davison, ‘Alteration of Wildlife Habitat as Prohibited Taking Under the Endangered Species Act’, 
1995 Florida State University Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law 10, no. 2, pp. 155-238.
36 515 US 687 (1995). 
37 In the wake of the TVA case, the Endangered Species Committee chaired by the Secretary of the Interior, was soon added to the ESA. This 
Committee, dubbed the ‘God Squad’, is empowered to exempt, albeit under strict conditions, parties from the no jeopardy requirement 
under Section 7 of the ESA. In reality, however, the ‘God Squad’ exemption has only scarcely been applied. 
38 Statement of President Richard M. Nixon, upon signing the Endangered Species Act, San Clamente, CA (December 28, 1973). 
39 Kishida, supra note 24, p. 507. 
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that exempts the activity at issue from the prohibition against ‘take’. In order for the exemption to apply, 
the taking is not the purpose of the harmful activity and the owner is obliged to minimize and mitigate 
their impact.40 When amending the ESA, Congress made the issuance of an ‘incidental take permit’ 
conditional on the creation of a Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP).41 Whereas the HCP was specifically 
designed for landowners who wish to develop their property but are prevented from doing so because 
of the ESA’s take prohibition, the use of HCPs remained relatively ‘modest’ for over a decade. In legal 
literature, it was submitted that the unfamiliarity with the process of applying for an incidental take 
permit, along with the time and cost associated with the creation of an HCP, were among the main causes 
of the ‘slow start’ of this new exemption regime.42
2.1.3. A focus on what is bad
The most seminal element in the overwhelming scepticism about HCPs was linked to the looming 
prospect of liability for listed species that were not covered by the HCP and for unanticipated injury 
to habitat.43 Another striking illustration thereof could be encountered in California, where the Delphi 
Sands Flowering-Loving Fly halted the construction of a $470 million earthquake-proof hospital.44 
Stories about businesses going bankrupt because of endangered species set the tone.45 At the same time, 
environmental groups blamed the ESA for not going far enough. However, some authors argued that the 
relatively bleak track record of the ESA is directly linked to the fact that it ‘punished those who do bad to 
species, but does nothing to make anyone do good’.46 Still others state that the ESA has played a crucial 
role in saving hundreds of imperilled species from extinction, but, at the same time, link the limited 
recovery success to the fact that most of the populations are already seriously depleted by the time they 
receive ESA protection.47
Be this as it may, it is generally conceded by both critics and supporters of the ESA that its focus 
is mainly on measures that limit harm to species. With approximately two thirds of the land in the 
continental United States privately owned and up to three quarters of all threatened species’ habitat 
being located on private lands, most commentators agree that achieving the recovery goal will largely 
depend on the incentives given to private landowners for habitat conservation and restoration.48 But then 
again, it is a widely shared view that the ESA lacks genuine incentives to compel or encourage private 
landowners to restore the habitats whose loss led to the listing of the species at stake in the first place.49 
As for land acquisition, it is held that it would be unrealistic to have high hopes in this regard.50
2.1.4. Shoot, shovel, and shut up!
The criticism regarding the ESA has recently taken a new turn. In recent years, the ESA has been accused 
of creating perverse incentives to engage in activities harmful to listed species to avoid being subject 
to ESA restrictions. A notable illustration was provided by a North Carolina landowner, named Cone, 
who made the headlines in the early 1990s by threatening to clear most of his forested property so as to 
keep endangered red-cockaded woodpeckers – which occupied a small section of his property – from 
inhabiting the remainder.51 The lack of reliable data does not allow us to conclude that such behaviour 
40 See for more extensive information: D.P. Wheeler & R.M. Rowberry, ‘Habitat Conservation Plans and the Endangered Species Act’, in Baur 
& Irvin (eds.), supra note 26, p. 222. 
41 See for an interesting overview of habitat conservation planning under the ESA: S.-L. Hsu, ‘The Potential and the Pitfalls of Habitat 
Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act’, 1999 Envtl. L. Rep. 29, p. 10592. 
42 D.P. Wheeler & R.M. Rowberry, ‘Habitat Conservation Plans and the Endangered Species Act’, in Baur & Irvin (eds.), supra note 26, p. 223. 
43 Ibid., p. 224. 
44 See: Paulich, supra note 20, p. 108. 
45 See for more extensive information: K.P. Sheldon, ‘Habitat Conservation Planning: Addressing the Achilles Heel of the Endangered Species 
Act’, 1998 N.Y.U. Envtl. L. J. 6, pp. 279-280. 
46 J.B. Ruhl, ‘Keeping the Endangered Species Act Relevant’, 2009 Duke Envtl. Law & Pol’y 19, p. 289. 
47 J. Kostyack & D. Rohlh, ‘Conserving Endangered Species in an Era of Global Warming’, in Baur & Irvin (eds.), supra note 26, pp. 375-376. 
48 See for instance: Paulich, supra note 20, p. 117; M.J. Bean, ‘Landowners’ Incentives and the Endangered Species Act’, in Baur & Irvin 
(eds.), supra note 26, p. 208. 
49 Bean, supra note 48, p. 208. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Michael J. Bean referred to this story in the introduction of his chapter on landowners’ incentives and the ESA. See: Bean, supra note 48, 
p. 208. 
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is widespread. Still, at least some authors have contended that this kind of undesirable behaviour is by 
no means an exception.52 What is more, some developers associations, such as the National Association 
of Home Builders, have openly promoted such methods that seek out to preemptively destroy habitat.53 
One of such practices is dubbed ‘midnight bulldozing’ and means that when a landowner or 
developer is notified of a species’ imminent listing they destroy this species’ habitat before its listing. In 
order to avoid subsequent restrictions, developers might indeed be tempted to ‘shoot, shovel and shut 
up’, as it is called by many legal authors.54 Some landowners have been reported to have engaged in the 
similar practice of expelling or, in some cases, even killing the species itself before the species’ listing 
under the ESA for the same reason.55 Whereas killing listed species obviously constitutes an unlawful act, 
punishable under the provisions of the ESA, this is not necessarily the case for the preemptive habitat 
destruction that takes place on land which does not host listed species (yet). Such action might indeed 
frustrate the intention of the law but, strictly speaking, does not violate the letter of the law.56 
2.2. The Habitats Directive: same story, different setting and timing? 
2.2.1. A bright example of effective nature conservation
The recent history of the EU nature directives shows some important parallels with the creation and 
early reception of the ESA. Whereas the first binding EC law on nature conservation, the Birds Directive, 
was enacted in as early as 1979, it took until the beginning of the 1990s before a more comprehensive 
framework on the conservation and the protection of European wildlife and natural habitats was in place. 
As was the case with the ESA, there was, at the time, widespread consensus among politicians regarding 
the enactment of a more specified and comprehensive protection scheme for the EU’s most threatened 
habitats and species. 
The rise of environmentalism throughout the 1970s and 1980s and the growing concern about 
the plight of the EU’s biodiversity set the scene for the adoption of what was, with the Birds Directive, 
widely seen as a ‘poster child of potentially effective law and policy’.57 As mentioned in the introduction, 
one of the most noteworthy accomplishments of the Habitats Directive, is the creation of the Natura 
2000 Network, an EU-wide ecological network comprising the most ecologically valuable lands in each 
Member State.58 
2.2.2. Leybucht and the cumbersome quest for more flexibility: TVA revisited?
In the early 1990s, the case law of the Court of Justice as regards the designation obligations of the Member 
States in relation to the Natura 2000 Network, which ranked conservation interests above economic 
considerations, led to some controversy among Member States about the concrete implications of the 
protection rules included in the Birds Directive.59 In the Court’s view, economic or recreational interests 
could not be relied on to encroach on an existing Special Protection Area (SPA).60 In a similar way as 
the TVA ruling of the US Supreme Court did, the Court of Justice’s 1991 Leybucht decision illustrated 
the many complications to which a rigid application of nature protection rules in the context of spatial 
development projects could give rise. 
In order to avoid future deadlock situations, the Member States agreed to include in the Habitats 
Directive a specific derogation clause widening the range of grounds justifying encroachment on SPAs 
52 Ibid., p. 209. 
53 Paulich, supra note 20, p. 130. 
54 Ibid., p. 129. 
55 Ibid., p. 128. 
56 Bean, supra note 48, p. 209. 
57 The wording was used by Lyster to describe the Birds Directive in his first compendium of international wildlife law (see: S. Lyster, 
International Wildlife Law, 1985, pp. 67-74). Also the Habitats Directive is often quoted as a shining example of effective nature 
conservation, as was noted by Wandesforde-Smith & Watts in their recent paper on the strengths and weaknesses of EU wildlife law. See: 
Wandesforde-Smith & Watts, supra note 3, pp. 79-80. 
58 In a certain way, this area protection scheme is comparable to the ESA’s obligation to designate ‘critical habitat’. See for more extensive 
information: Verschuuren, supra note 23, p. 59. 
59 Case C-57/89, Commission v. Germany, [1991] ECR I-883, Para. 20. 
60 See on Art. 6(4) of the Habitats Directive: R. Clutten & I. Tafur, ‘Are Imperative Reasons Imperiling the Habitats Directive? An Assessment 
of Article 6(4) and the IROPI Exception’, in G. Jones QC (ed.), The Habitats Directive: A Developer’s Obstacle Course?, 2012, pp. 167-182. 
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and thereby allowing planning authorities to derogate from the general system of protection for reasons 
of overriding public interest. However, the application of derogation clause contained in Article 6(4) 
of the Habitats Directive never really took off. Whilst most Member States are not inherently opposed 
to it, they deem it to be of a too restrictive nature for many spatial developments, especially those that 
involved private businesses.61 And even when effectively applied, it turned out economic factors often 
superseded a strict assessment of the intended compensatory measures. In particular, recent analysis has 
highlighted that even the European Commission, when issuing opinions under the second subparagraph 
of Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive, often departs from the strict derogation conditions set forth by 
Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive.62 
Be this as it may, the habitat assessment requirement as included in Article 6(3) of the Habitats 
Directive was increasingly referred to by business people as a major barrier for project development 
in the context of Natura 2000 sites. Whilst, at first, national courts proved quite reluctant to scrutinize 
planning decisions in light of the procedural and substantive requirements set forth by Article 6(3) of the 
Habitats Directive, recent case law in some Member States, like the Netherlands and Belgium, seems to 
display greater willingness to apply a rigid standard of review.63 The strict application of the precautionary 
principle, as put forward by the Court of Justice in the Waddenzee case, underscored the need for a more 
precise and meticulous assessment of the potential effects on Natura 2000 sites of plans and projects.64 
Admittedly, in Member States, such as Ireland65 and Greece,66 the EU nature directives have been 
poorly enforced so far. Yet in other Member States, such as the Netherlands, the UK and Germany, where 
the implementation deficit is relatively low, the EU nature directives, regardless of varying degrees of 
review,67 are increasingly referred to as ‘obstacle course’ for project development. In recent decades, the 
extension of port areas,68 the creation of new industrial estates or the construction of major infrastructure 
works,69 including renewable energy projects, have increasingly collided with Natura 2000.70 
2.2.3. Hamsters, natterjack toads and bats… yet more obstacles?
In spite of the few ‘hard cases’ that have made the headlines in some Member States, the image of EU 
nature conservation law as ‘ultimate bottleneck’ needs some adjustment in light of the fairly limited 
amount of projects that ultimately had to be cancelled due to biodiversity-related concerns. Even in 
the Netherlands, a country renowned for its relatively high number of lawsuits in which the Habitats 
Directive was enforced before courts, only a few plans and projects have been cancelled due to biodiversity 
legislation. Still, the prevailing idea among many Dutch actors is that European directives frustrate almost 
every development in the Netherlands.71 
Rather than tackling the lack of proper implementation, which is often the main cause of additional 
delays, focus recently shifted to the additional constraints to which the strict rules on species protection 
could lead in the context of project developments. Indeed, in the past ten years the rules on strict species 
protection have been referred to as yet another formidable threat to the viability of project developments. 
In contrast to the protection regime connected to Natura 2000 sites, the strict protection rules enshrined 
61 See also in this regard: Opinion Advocate General Sharpston, Sweetman, Peter Sweetman and Others v. An Bord Pleanála, 2013, not yet 
published, Para. 65. 
62 See for instance: D. McGillivray, ‘Compensating Biodiversity Loss: the EU Commission’s Approach to Compensation under Art. 6 of the 
Habitats Directive’, 2012 Journal of Environmental Law 24, no. 3, pp. 417-450. 
63 See among others: H. Schoukens & A. Cliquet, ‘Mitigation and Compensation under EU Nature Conservation Law in the Flemish Region: 
Beyond the Deadlock for Development Projects’, 2014 Utrecht Law Review 10, no. 2, pp. 194-215.
64 Case C-127/02, Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee en Nederlandse Vereniging tot Bescherming van Vogels v. 
Staatssecretaris van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, [2004] ECR I-7405, Para. 59.
65 See for instance: B. Laffan & J. O’Mahony, ‘Bringing Politics Back In: Domestic Conflict and the Negotiated Implementation of EU Nature 
Conservation Law in Ireland’, 2008 Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 10, no. 2, pp. 175-197. 
66 G. Kûtting, ‘Nature Conservation Law in Context: The Limited Influence of European Union and Greek Designations on the Future of Cavo 
Sidero, Crete’, 2012 Journal International Wildlife Law & Policy 15, no. 1, pp. 60-79.
67 See among others: Wandesforde-Smith & Watts, supra note 3.
68 See for more extensive information: Morris, supra note 9, pp. 361-369.
69 For an overview of the case law in the Flemish Region in this regard, see: Schoukens & Cliquet, supra note 63, pp. 194-215. 
70 See: A.L.R. Jackson, ‘Renewable energy vs. biodiversity: Policy conflicts and the future of nature conservation’, 2011 Global Environmental 
Change 21, no. 4, pp. 1195-1208.
71 See for more extensive information: Beunen & Duineveld, supra note 10. 
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in Article 12(1) of the Habitats Directive, with its counterparts in Article 5(1) of the Birds Directive, 
cover a wide range of harmful acts and apply throughout the territory of a Member State.72 
Additionally, they are also concerned with protecting individual animals rather than the population of 
a species vis-à-vis potential harmful activities. Whilst some business people might consider it reasonable 
to safeguard the most valuable natural sites within the EU, the prospect of seeing a development project, 
which is not located close to a designated Natura 2000 site, halted by the mere presence of two individuals 
of a listed bird or animal species, was an even more bitter pill to swallow. 
In the wake of several apparently strict rulings of the Court of Justice it became apparent that merely 
transposing the protection rules in national or regional legislation, which sometimes also proved to be 
a daunting task,73 was not sufficient in the Commission’s eyes. Member States also had to ensure the 
concrete, precise and coordinated application and enforcement of these rules on the ground, as was 
strikingly illustrated by the Court’s notable decision in the Carretta Carretta case.74 For instance, in 2006 
Greece was again convicted, this time for not having provided for sufficient protection measures on the 
island of Milos for the Cyclades blunt-nosed viper,75 while France was held liable in 2011 for not having 
taken sufficient measures to halt the decline of its scattered populations of wild hamsters.76 All these cases 
illustrated the possible restrictions for land use activities linked to the presence of European protected 
species.77 
2.2.4. A new deadlock situation looming?
As was the case with the protection regime connected to Natura 2000 sites, planning authorities at first did 
not really bother to consider the impact of proposed plans or projects on protected species. This proved 
to be a risky strategy since even in the absence of national or regional provisions correctly transposing 
Article 12(1) of the Habitats Directive, it can still be relied on by private individuals and environmental 
NGOs before the national courts by virtue of the so-called ‘direct effect’ doctrine.78 The notable Dutch 
‘hamster case’ serves as a good illustration of the lax attitude in the early 2000s and the dire consequences 
of not taking due regard of the provisions of EU nature conservation law in the context of planning law at 
the national or local level.79 Initially, the Dutch municipality of Heerlen showed little appreciation for the 
likely presence of wild hamsters on the site that was designated to become a cross-boundary industrial 
estate. Ultimately, this approach proved faulty since the zoning plan was quashed by the Dutch Council 
of State given the fact that the planning authority had not considered its possible impact on the protected 
species.80 At the same time, the exemption that had been obtained under the Dutch Flora and Fauna law 
for the project, was also revoked since no thorough investigation of other available alternatives had taken 
place.81 
Despite the fact that the project was eventually approved, the so-called Dutch ‘hamster case’ is often 
quoted as an important landmark case for EU species protection law in the Netherlands. Whilst it was 
in itself not capable of halting the further decline of the rodent species, it can be called a ‘game changer’ 
since it revealed the delays and burdens that could be caused whenever the likely presence of a protected 
species is disregarded during the determination of planning applications. Also in other Member States, 
72 In order to avoid all too many inconsistencies when applying these rules and to bring them more into the spotlight, the European 
Commissions promulgated a set of additional guidelines on the interpretation of the strict protection regime for animal species in 2007: 
European Commission, Guidance document on the strict protection of animal species of Community interest under the Habitats Directive 
92/43/EEC, 2007. 
73 Case C-6/04, Commission v. UK, [2005] ECR I-09017.
74 Case C-103/00, Commission v. Greece, [2002] ECR I-01147.
75 Case C-518/04, Commission v. Greece, [2006] ECR I-00042, Paras. 20-21.
76 Case C-383/09, Commission v. France, [2011] ECR I-04869. 
77 Some Member States have tried to downplay the significance of the strict rules on species protection, especially in order to protect their 
spatial planning policy against external interference. Yet these efforts have proved largely unsuccessful until now. For instance, in its case 
law the Court has clarified that the requirement of ‘intent’, as included in Art. 12(1)(b) of the Habitats Directive, also covers situations 
where the disturbance of protected species was only perceived as a mere side effect of an activity. Case C-221/04, Commission v. Spain, 
[2006] ECR I-04515, Paras. 72-74.
78 See for more extensive information: Schoukens & Bastmeijer, supra note 8, pp. 129-132. 
79 See for more extensive information: Verschuuren, supra note 23, pp. 55-56. 
80 Dutch Council of State, Case no. E01.97.0672 (1999).
81 Dutch Council of State, Case no. 199901039/1 (2000).
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such as Belgium, the increased number of collisions between protected species and economic aspirations 
soon made it to the headlines of the national press. In 2013, a Flemish municipality had to reconsider 
its zoning plan for recreational facilities since throughout the preparation process it had not sufficiently 
taken into account the presence on the future construction site of a protected ant species.82 In the UK, 
the 2011 decision of the U.K. Supreme Court in Morge highlighted, albeit on a more general note, that 
planning authorities have to take into account species protection law.83 
2.2.5. Increasing criticism and a lack of incentives for robust habitat restoration efforts?
The scarce room for reconciliation of robust habitat restoration measures with the applicable protection 
rules has led many authors to conclude that EU nature conservation law is applied too dogmatically 
by judges to allow for a good balance between economic development and nature conservation.84 It is 
argued that, given their rigor and vigour, the EU nature directives risk being perceived as nothing more 
than an obstacle course for developers.85 Conversely, other authors detect the poor compliance with 
the procedural and substantive requirements as one of the major reasons for the limited success of EU 
nature conservation law so far.86 The fact that many Member States still need to step up their Natura 
2000 designation efforts, poignantly illustrates this point.87 That said, in order to reverse the declining 
trend, more clear-cut restoration duties should be included in the EU rules. It is true that Member 
States, given the deplorable state of many Natura 2000 sites, will have to implement comprehensive 
management measures in these protected sites in order to attain the objectives of the Habitats Directive.88 
In a 2014 Guidance, the European Commission explicitly clarified that restoration measures are also to 
be envisaged pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Habitats Directive. Such measures could include works to 
restore the hydrology of a wetland, replant some species, and reintroduce or reinforce populations of 
endangered species.89 In accordance with the subsidiarity principle, Member States are free to decide 
how to implement this provision in practice, provided that the overall objective of the Habitats Directive 
is not jeopardized.90
Unfortunately, the Habitats Directive does not lay down similar duties for habitats restoration 
outside these protected sites. The lack thereof might seriously jeopardize the survival of many endangered 
species, especially those whose habitat is not confined to Natura 2000 sites. This is the case for example 
for many farmland species, such as wild hamsters and skylarks. Also the rules on strict species protection 
are not capable of closing this loophole. Especially Article 12(1) of the Habitats Directive seems too 
preoccupied with laying down protection rules of a preventative nature. The lack of a clear-cut duty to 
restore has not refrained the Court of Justice from obliging Member States to adequately provide for 
the necessary recovery measures for endangered species, which include, among others, comprehensive 
species action plans.91 Still, neither the Court nor the Advocate General has ever explicitly ordered the 
Member States to enact robust habitat restoration measures for strictly protected species.92 Moreover, in 
a 2007 Guidance document the European Commission even explicitly underlined that proactive habitat 
management measures are not required under Article 12(1) of Annex IV species.93 
Accordingly, as was partly the case with the ESA, also EU nature conservation law seems to fall short 
of laying down a comprehensive set of restoration rules or incentives for areas outside the Natura 2000 
Network. This means that 80% of the EU territory is left outside the scope of the restoration approach 
82 Belgian Council of State, Case no. 222.543 (2013).
83 Morge (FC) (Appellant) v. Hampshire County Council 2011 UKSC 2.
84 Kistenkas, supra note 11, p. 83.
85 Wandesforde-Smith & Watts, supra note 3, pp. 65-69.
86 See among others: Schoukens, supra note 7, pp. 11-12.
87 Natura 2000 Newsletter, no. 34, July 2013, p. 9. 
88 A similar approach can be found in Art. 4(1) and 4(2) of the Birds Directive. 
89 European Commission, Establishing conservation measures for Natura 2000 Sites. A review of the provisions of Article 6.1 and their practical 
implementation in different Member States, 2014, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/management/docs/
conservation%20measures.pdf> (accessed 12 January 2015). 
90 Case C-508/04, Commission v. Austria, [2007] ECR I-03787, Paras. 75-76. 
91 See among others: Case C-183/05, Commission v. Ireland, [2007] ECR I-00137, Paras. 14-15. 
92 See for more extensive information: H. Schoukens, ‘Going Beyond the Status Quo: Towards a Duty for Species Restoration Under EU Law?’, 
in V. Sancin & M. Kovič  Dine (eds.), International Environmental Law: Contemporary Concerns and Challenges in 2014, 2014, pp. 343-358. 
93 European Commission, supra note 72, p. 20.
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which implicitly underpins the EU nature directives.94 The disparate and varying compliance rates at the 
national level make it hard to conclude that the prohibitive nature of the Habitats Directive is likely to 
create perverse incentives similar to the ‘shoot, shovel, and shut up’ examples that have emerged in the 
United States. Still, in recent literature it has indeed been noted that the tightening regulatory framework 
has compelled Dutch and Flemish landowners and property developers to refrain from opting for habitat 
restoration measures on their lands. Instead of choosing for habitat restoration, mostly intensive mowing 
and regular ploughing are opted for, excluding any benefits for endangered species.95 Recently, a Belgian 
harbour company relied on similar avoidance practices in order to prevent that protected sea gulls settled 
on the plots of land intended for the enlargement of an industrial estate.96 These actions were deemed 
legal according to a lower court ruling of 18 April 2014 since they did not target birds that actually 
roosted on the to-be developed land.97
3.  Beyond the status quo: encouraging habitat restoration for species via the safe harbor 
approach? 
3.1. Towards a more collaborative approach?
From the above analysis it can be concluded that, in order to make a tangible difference on the ground, 
conservation law should not confine itself to laying down a command and control approach, merely 
based on the prohibition of harmful activities. Granted, prohibitive regulation will remain seminal in 
safeguarding the survival chances of some endangered species. Protection and restoration therefore are 
not interchangeable in the approach towards the current biodiversity crisis. Moreover, whilst prohibitions 
are generally of a defensive nature, they can also help to restore or improve habitats insofar as they enable 
positive natural developments to take place. In the absence of additional threats, some endangered species 
may well recover by natural process.98 However, given the fact that a large share of the remaining habitat 
of the endangered species in both the United States and EU is located on privately owned lands and taking 
into account the limited territorial scope of protected area legislation, the aforementioned prohibitive 
approach indeed might not suffice to halt and reverse the declining trend for many endangered species. 
As was established above, both the ESA and the EU nature directives seem to ‘punish’ private 
landowners that have species habitat on their land by restricting future land development options. 
Hence landowners and property developers are, rather ironically, supported in their implementation 
of management strategies that prevent the presence of endangered species on their plots of land. Such 
behaviour, if applied on a wider scale, might cripple the already limited effectiveness of nature conservation 
law even further. In order to allow nature to bounce back a more collaborative approach needs to be 
promoted, aimed at rewarding private landowners for habitat conservation and restoration on their 
lands instead of punishing them. Recently, the momentum has been building for a more incentive-based 
approach toward nature conservation. In the United States the first seeds were sown for an alternative 
approach towards species recovery on private lands. 
3.2.  Safe Harbor Agreements (SHAs) in the United States: A new incentive for habitat restoration on 
privately owned lands? 
3.2.1. No alarms and no surprises, please?
The fierce political opposition to the ESA, sparked by the 1973 TVA case and the rigid application of the 
take prohibition on private lands, urged the Congress to alleviate the strict restrictions on landowners 
by offering additional room for exceptions. As mentioned above, incidental take permits and HCPs, 
which mostly comprised additional mitigation strategies, were introduced as an additional exemption 
94 Cliquet et al., supra note 4, pp. 280-283. 
95 Woldendorp, supra note 22. 
96 See (in Dutch): <http://www.demorgen.be/dm/nl/5381/Dieren/article/detail/1826587/2014/03/23/Rechter-zet-havenuitbreiding-
Zeebrugge-on-hold-omdat-die-meeuwen-bedreigt.dhtml> (accessed 30 November 2014). 
97 Ruling of 18 April 2014 of the President of the Court of First Instance of Bruges, Case no. 14/119/C. 
98 See in a similar vein: Opinion Advocate General Kokott in Commission v. France, supra note 76, Para. 45. 
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ground to the ESA in 1983. The hope was that ‘bargaining in the shadow of the law’ might be more 
effective in reaching the biodiversity policy goals.99 HCPs were promoted as examples of a ‘win-win 
collaborative process’ and seemed to offer an attractive blueprint by allowing landowners more flexibility 
in meeting conservation goals. In order to foster the success of HCPs, the so-called ‘no surprises policy’ 
was introduced in 1994.100 In this approach, the FWS may grant the assurance that if a permittee fully 
complies with the terms of the HCP that adequately covers a species, the FWS will not require the 
permittee to take any further mitigation measures deemed necessary in the future.101 
One could summarize this approach as follows: providing regulatory certainty in exchange for 
environmental commitments.102 With the enactment of the no-surprises rule, the FWS sent out an 
important signal to private landowners: if they adhered to the terms of their HCPs, they would not be 
required to take additional mitigation measures, even if new species were to settle on the lands. Should 
unexpected circumstances require intervention and/or modification of the HCP, the additional expense is 
to be borne by the federal government or cooperating public entity, not the landowner.103 The publication 
of the no-surprises rule actually managed to arouse the enthusiasm for HCPs among project developers 
in the United States. In its first eight years of application, a 13-fold increase in the number of approved 
HCPs was noted.104 However, in spite of creating more incentives among landowners to enter into HCPs, 
the no-surprises rule did not remain unchallenged. In fact, only in 2007 did the District Court dismiss 
the claims that were brought against the no-surprises rule, holding that the issuance of incidental permits 
was not governed by a recovery-based standard.105 
This being the case, HCPs still faced rising criticism. Many authors contended that in the end the 
HCPs did not really help achieve the recovery of listed species. In the HCPs, the FWS mostly settled for 
the more modest goals of only making sure that they did not appreciably reduce the likelihood of survival 
and recovery of the species in the wild.106 One of the most prevalent points of criticism referred to the 
poor outcomes of the negotiation process for HCPs which, in many cases, did not differ substantially 
from the scenario in which no ESA restrictions were present. In other words, the FWS was criticized 
for conceding to landowners far more than necessary to obtain their consent to an HCP. And therefore, 
landowners and loggers were not really pushed to alter their harmful behaviour.107 In some HCPs the 
mitigation requirements simply came down to ordering a project developer to do what was already 
required by state law. Moreover, studies have revealed that the long-term commitments under HCPs are 
hard to sustain in the face of ever-changing ecological, economic and political circumstances.108 Some 
environmentalists have chastised the FWS for having been ‘captured’ by the interests that it must regulate, 
namely those of project developers and loggers. In addition, others have pointed to the lack of effective 
citizen participation under HCPs.109 
Surely not all HCP examples make a grim reading for species conservation and recovery, and if 
properly prepared, HCPs might simultaneously address both economic and conservation or restoration 
interests.110 That said, by and large HCPs remain a reactive instrument and, as such, do not actively 
promote conservation efforts that go beyond the status quo. 
3.2.2. Safe Harbor Agreements: going beyond the status quo?
Arguably HCPs managed to promote habitat conservation and restoration among property developers 
and business people. They are indeed capable of making the best of a bad situation. However, in order 
99 See more in detail: Wheeler & Rowberry, supra note 42, pp. 223-224. 
100 Habitat Conservation Plans Assurances (‘No Surprises’) Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. P. 8859 (Feb. 23, 1998). 
101 Ibid. 
102 Wheeler & Rowberry, supra note 42, p. 225.
103 Ibid., p. 224.
104 Ibid., pp. 224-225.
105 Spirit of the Sage Council v. Kempthorne, 511 F. Supp. 2d 31, pp. 41-43 (D.C. 2007).
106 Hsu, supra note 41. See also: Sheldon, supra note 45, p. 279; J. Tasso, ‘Habitat Conservation Plans as Recovery Vehicles: Jump-Starting the 
Endangered Species Act’, 1998 U.C.L.A. J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 16, no. 2, pp. 297-318.
107 Hsu, supra note 41.
108 Wheeler & Rowberry, supra note 42, pp. 236-237. 
109 S. Vanderheiden, ‘Habitat Conservation Plans and the Promise of Deliberative Democracy’, 2001 Public Integrity 3, no. 3, p. 212.
110 Hsu, supra note 41.
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to achieve recovery and restoration goals, a more ambitious policy tool is needed, aimed at encouraging 
habitat conservation efforts among landowners who do not necessarily want to develop their land in 
the short term but want to reserve the right to do so at a later stage. Without any effective incentive 
mechanisms, such landowners might still take recourse to the aforementioned ‘shoot, shovel and shut up’ 
strategy. 
In the 1990s, the so-called ‘Safe Harbor Agreements’ were designed by the US federal government 
in order to solve this challenge.111 Under a Safe Harbor Agreement (SHA) landowners voluntarily use 
their property to benefit species and, in return, are provided with a ‘safe harbor’, guaranteeing that no 
additional conservation measures will be imposed on their lands, even if the number of threatened or 
endangered species grows as a result of the actions of the landowner. In short, one could submit that, 
with this tool, the US federal government wanted to alter the impression that the ESA was there only 
to unfairly penalize private landowners who had ‘the bad luck’ of hosting threatened or endangered 
species.112 By opting for a SHA, landowners are offered legal certainty in exchange for their commitment 
to creating a positive net outcome for the threatened and endangered species that are present on these 
lands. The agreement is concluded between cooperating non-federal property owners and the FWS or 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which is responsible for most listed 
marine and anadromous fish species.
In exchange for their recovery actions, the participating landowners receive formal assurances from 
the FWS or the NOAA that the FWS will not require any additional or different management activities 
by the participants without their consent. More importantly, the participants may, at the end of the 
agreement period, return the enrolled property to the baseline conditions that existed at the beginning of 
the SHA. This will even be the case if such alterations result in the incidental removal of the listed species. 
By doing so, it is hoped that SHAs will further encourage proactive species conservation efforts by private 
and other non-federal property owners while at the same time offering the participating landowners 
certainty in relation to future land use restrictions, even if the management actions effectively result 
in listed species settling on the enrolled properties or lead to an increase in the number of individuals 
present on the lands. Landowners are completely free to enter into a SHA. A SHA may therefore be 
initiated either by the property owner, the FWS or a state agency. Evidently, state agencies may seek to 
encourage property owners to consider entering into a SHA.113 
3.2.3. Policy instrument official from 1999 
The first SHAs were initiated in 1995. Still, the SHA Policy only became officially effective according 
to the Federal Register of June 1999.114 As far as the objective and purpose of the SHA are concerned, 
the 1999 Policy Document did not alter much. It reiterated that the basic objective of a SHA is to do 
away with the defensive management strategies of landowners and create a positive net benefit for the 
threatened and endangered species whose habitats are often exclusively confined to private owned lands. 
In its 1999 Policy Document, the FWS effectively emphasised that, before entering into a SHA, the 
competent authorities have to issue written findings that all covered species will receive a net conservation 
benefit from management actions taken under the SHA. At the same time, it is acknowledged that 
the contribution toward recovery will vary from case to case, and, at any rate, the SHA does not have 
to provide permanent conservation for the enrolled property. Or, to use the words of the FWS: ‘Net 
conservation benefits must contribute, directly or indirectly, to the recovery of the covered species. 
This contribution towards recovery will vary and may not be permanent’.115 Possible conservation 
benefits may result from maintenance, restoration or enhancement of existing habitats, reduced habitat 
fragmentation and/or increases in habitat connectivity, stabilized or increased numbers or distribution, 
111 See more on the roots and origins of the Safe Harbor Agreement policy approach: Bean et al., supra note 24; Kishida, supra note 24. 
112 Kishida, supra note 24.
113 A SHA cannot only be entered into by a single property owner. Also more ‘programmatic’ SHAs can be developed, which involve multiple 
property owners. In such a scenario, the entity that has signed the SHA can transfer the assurances to the individual property owners 
which are eager to be involved in the SHA, thereby reducing the administrative hurdle to be taken. 
114 64 Fed. Reg. 32, 706, 32, p. 717 (June 17, 1999) (hereafter ‘SHA Policy Document’).
115 Ibid., p. 723.
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the creation of buffers for protected areas and opportunities to test and develop new habitat management 
techniques.116 Although the benefits may only buy a little extra time, for many endangered species buying 
such a little extra time might be crucial to safeguard their long-term survival and recovery.117 Missing out 
on these temporary benefits might be to the detriment for the survival chances of many listed species. 
The assurances offered by the SHA are connected to the enrolled lands and remain valid as long as 
the participating landowner complies with the SHA.118 The 1999 Policy Document does not really rule 
out the possibility of revoking the permit implementing the SHA. However, this possibility is described 
as ‘a last resort’ option, for situations where continuation of the permitted activity would be likely to 
jeopardise a species covered in the permit. 
The reliance on the creation of positive net effects on the populations of endangered or threatened 
species clearly sets the SHA apart from the HCP, in which project developers commit themselves to 
offsetting and mitigating the harm caused by future project developments to listed species. In the context 
of a SHA no reference is made to any concrete harmful activities. As stated above, SHAs in essence 
represent a voluntary process, whereas project developers involved in the HCPs process are required 
to consider mitigation actions in order to obtain an incidental take permit.119 SHAs are not necessarily 
linked to harmful planning projects. 
The ‘net conservation benefits’ which have to be established by a SHA also help explain the legal 
reasoning which has been used to reconcile SHAs with the ESA. The first series of SHAs was established 
under the provision that was also used to issue HCPs, thereby blurring the difference between the two 
tools. In its 1999 Policy Document, the FWS decided to link SHAs to Section 10(a)(1)(A) of the ESA, which 
allows for the issuance of permits to enhance the propagation or survival of affected species.120 In order 
to avoid abuse, the participating landowner will have to demonstrate that the agreed baseline conditions 
were maintained and that the management activities listed in the SHA in order to achieve the net benefits 
have been carried out for the duration of the agreement.121 For these reasons, the FWS considers it crucial 
to determine the so-called ‘baseline conditions’. Also, from the landowner’s perspective, establishing the 
baseline is decisive in order to assess the ambit of the assurances granted to him by virtue of the permit 
issued in the context of the SHA. Both the FWS and the participating landowners have an interest in 
clearly determining baseline conditions in order to avoid future disputes during the implementation 
of the SHA. In the FWS’s view, the baseline conditions must reflect the known biological and habitat 
characteristics that support existing levels of use of the property by species covered in the SHA.122 
In order to take into account natural fluctuations in species populations and avoid unreasonable 
outcomes for the participating landowners, the competent services will have to rely on population 
estimates to determine the degree of occupancy of the enrolled lands by covered species. In practice, 
the baseline conditions will take into account the amount and condition of habitat in the enrolled lands 
and not the exact number of individuals of the species present on the site at stake. Evidently, the baseline 
will have to be established at zero whenever no seasonal or permanent occupation by covered species 
on the enrolled property has been documented.123 In order to effectively assess the compliance of the 
participating landowners with the SHA, a monitoring programme needs to be implemented. At the same 
time, the outcome of these monitoring activities will also allow the services to better evaluate the overall 
programme and ensure its continued development.
Since nature is not static, the 1999 Policy Document also needed to establish some additional 
guidelines for cases in which non-covered or newly listed species settle on the lands enrolled in a SHA. 
To this end it is noted that, if desirable, the SHA can be amended in order for the non-covered species 
to be included. In such a scenario, the involved parties will have to agree on the additional conservation 
and management actions that are needed for the recovery of the non-covered species. The participating 
116 Ibid.
117 Bean, supra note 48, p. 210.
118 Ibid.
119 Kishida, supra note 24.
120 Bean, supra note 48, p. 210. 
121 Ibid. 
122 SHA Policy Document, supra note 114, p. 723.
123 Ibid., p. 724.
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property owners are also encouraged to involve the public in the development of the SHA. Yet the 
discretion to opt for public participation is largely retained by the property owner. This being the case, 
the FWS will still make every SHA available for public review and comment as part of the evaluation 
process for issuance of the Enhancement of Survival Permit.124 
3.2.4. First results on the ground?
Whilst obviously aimed at creating additional benefits for endangered species, by removing the existing 
disincentives for habitat management and restoration on private lands and replacing the ‘us against them’ 
mentality that has permeated nature conservation efforts these past decades, the SHA tool somehow 
remains controversial. In the end, the participating landowners are allowed to carry out harmful 
activities on the enrolled lands, thereby bringing them back to their baseline conditions. As a result, the 
landowners are allowed to ‘take’ the additional protected species that have settled on his lands. For some 
conservationists, such destruction might be a bitter pill to swallow.
Having said this, SHAs have already achieved some remarkable successes. According to the website 
of the Environmental Defense Fund, one of the first propagators of the concept of SHA, ‘the owners of 
some four million acres nationwide are welcoming 63 rare species under Safe Harbor Agreements’.125 
Notwithstanding the impressive track record, the lack of comprehensive studies on the effectiveness 
of SHAs makes it hard to conclude whether this novel instrument has managed to fulfil its ambitious 
environmental goals without alienating the participating landowners. In fact, most SHAs have a short 
recent history and it therefore remains hard to draw general conclusions on the success of SHAs so far, 
especially taking into account the slow reproduction rate of many species. Luckily, the scarce literature 
on the topic provides us with a deeper analysis of the first three SHAs that were developed in the United 
States, being the 1995 North Carolina Sandhills SHA for protecting the red-cockaded woodpecker, 
the 1995 Texas Coastal Prairie SHA and the 1996 Texas Nothern Aplomado Falcon Reintroduction 
SHA.126 These three agreements are not only the first three that were developed, they also cover bird 
species whose distinct features allow us to carry out a meaningful analysis of the effectiveness of the 
SHAs.127 Interestingly, the SHAs for the aplomado falcon and the Attwater prairie chicken heavily focus 
on reintroduction efforts, whereas the SHA for the red-cockaded woodpecker focuses more on the 
preservation of the remaining habitats.128 
Of the three SHAs mentioned, the results achieved by the SHA for the aplomado falcon are said 
to be most impressive, especially taking into account the deplorable status of this bird species in the 
United States throughout a bigger part of the 20th century. With the last aplomado falcon recorded in the 
United States in the 1950s, the situation appeared quite bleak by 1960. In the 1980s some captive breeding 
programmes had been initiated rather successfully. However, releasing the birds on privately owned lands 
became less evident, especially in light of the listing of this species under the ESA in 1986. Since 97% of 
Texas (the target state for the recovery of these birds) was private property, finding additional release sites 
on non-public lands was crucial for the recovery of the aplomado falcon. In the mid-1990s, the Peregrine 
Fund considered the establishment of a SHA in order to facilitate the ongoing reintroduction efforts 
for the aplomado falcon.129 Compared to the two other SHAs, the Texas Nothern Aplomado Falcon 
Reintroduction SHA heavily relied on the reintroduction of both captive-bred and wild populations to 
recolonize existing habitats. As a result, the baseline population number for most landowners was zero. 
Several authors recorded the SHA as essential leverage to foster enthusiasm among landowners for these 
reintroduction efforts, resulting in more than one million acres being enrolled in the SHA merely two 
years after its inception.130 Since the modest reintroduction efforts in the 1980s and early 1990s, the SHA 
was the framework for the release of no fewer than 672 birds in its first six years.
124 Ibid. 
125 See: <http://www.edf.org/ecosystems/protecting-wildlife-right-incentives> (accessed 30 November 2014). 
126 Bean et al., supra note 24; Kishida, supra note 24.
127 Kishida, supra note 24.
128 Ibid. 
129 See for more extensive information on the background of this SHA: Bean et al., supra note 24; Kishida, supra note 24.
130 Ibid. 
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Arguably this SHA can be seen as a great success. Bean et al. concluded that ‘The SHA helped to 
restore a once vanished species to the landscape of south Texas, and it has done so without the rancour 
and controversy that has sometimes accompanied reintroduction efforts of other species elsewhere’.131 At 
the same time, Kishida warns that, whilst the biological accomplishments of the SHA cannot be ignored, 
a large part of the success can in effect be attributed to the ecological features of the aplomado falcon 
itself. It was noted that ‘the high survival rate of reintroduced birds, the excellent mobility of the falcons, 
and the relatively low acreage requirements per individual bird perhaps represent a rare convergence of 
qualities, ones which most other endangered species do not possess’.132 
Looking at the other two SHAs, the picture becomes more blurred. The 1995 North Carolina Sandhills 
SHA for protecting the red-cockaded woodpecker also appears to be a success story. This species was 
once thriving in the United States, its habitat extending from East Texas to Florida and New Jersey. The 
loss of old-growth pine forest is to blame for the sharp decline of the red-cockaded woodpecker. By 
the mid-1990s fewer than twenty of these birds remained in the state of Virginia, exemplifying their 
predicament. As was the case in Texas, many landowners in North Carolina were very wary of the ESA 
and its restrictions. Apparently, this attitude was altered by the SHA, which grew increasingly popular 
among landowners. The participating landowners agreed to carry out prescribed burns, artificial nest 
cavity drilling, hardwood undergrowth removal and forest rotation lengthening.133 With these measures, 
the SHA also managed to reverse the negative trend for the red-cockaded woodpecker population.134
In sharp contrast with the aforementioned two SHAs, the Texas Coastal Prairie SHA could easily 
be qualified as a blatant failure. More than a century ago, the Attwater prairie chicken population was 
estimated to be up to a million birds. Intensive hunting and the loss of 97% of its suitable habitat brought 
this species to the brink of extinction. Almost all of the chickens live in two government-run wildlife 
refuges. In spite of the Attwater prairie chicken being one of the most endangered species in the United 
States, the SHA has reportedly fallen short of delivering the expected outcome. However, some authors 
have pointed out that, with the entry into force of the SHA, the decline of this species has been somewhat 
mitigated in comparison with earlier decades.135 
Despite the positive appraisal of the above SHAs in the available literature, it remains hard to induce 
from this some general trends. Obviously, the SHAs should be given credit for increasing or at least 
stabilizing a covered species’ population. As already referred to by Kishida, the unknown variable is how 
long these benefits are likely to last with none of the participating landowners yet having exercised their 
recognized right to return the enrolled property back to its original state.136 
3.3. A safe harbor for temporary nature on private lands in the EU?
3.3.1. More opportunities for habitat restoration on private lands?
The quest for more flexibility in conservation law did not remain limited to the United States. Also in the 
EU both business people and planning authorities craved for more freedom to manoeuvre. One of the 
perceived rigidities of EU species protection law touched on in the previous part is the fact that it seems 
exclusively aimed at the protection of individual specimens of species, without taking into consideration 
the broader picture. Not surprisingly, recent years have seen a push from the protection of individual 
specimens to the preservation of larger populations. On the surface, such a shift appears sensible as it 
will allow more flexibility and leeway when issuing permits for spatial developments. Given the growing 
importance of the strict species protection rules, the attempts to implement more flexible approaches 
towards nature protection have increasingly focused on the room for weighing harmful interventions 
against the protection rules in Article 12(1) of the Habitats Directive. 
Against the background of the alleged tight jurisprudence and guidelines, new ways were sought to 
better align spatial development and species protection. As was the case with the HCPs under the ESA, a 
131 Bean et al., supra note 24.
132 Kishida, supra note 24.
133 Environmental Defense Fund, Safe Harbor: Helping Landowners Help Endangered Species, 1999, p. 2.
134 Ibid. 
135 Kishida, supra note 24.
136 Ibid. 
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more strategic and consensus-driven approach towards mitigation grew more popular in Member States 
such as the Netherlands, the UK and Belgium. Whilst Article 16(1) of the Habitats Directive provides 
some limited room for derogation from the protection rules, most planning authorities did not want 
to align their projects with the strict requirements set out by this provision. As had been the case with 
Article 6(4), it was generally agreed that the adoption of more generic mitigation strategies aimed at 
reducing the impact of a harmful project below the significant threshold would suffice in order to bypass 
the application of Article 16(1) of the Habitats Directive. As long as these strategies relied on genuine 
mitigation measures little to no trouble arose. However, since the inclusion of such measures did not 
always succeed in effectively reducing the harm created by project developments, mitigation strategies 
increasingly tried to include the implementation of habitat creation or restoration measures close to an 
affected breeding or roosting site, mostly on privately owned lands. 
Despite the attempts to create more flexibility in recent years, both national courts and the European 
Court of Justice have significantly tightened the room left for this more pragmatic approach towards 
mitigation. For instance, the Dutch Council of State has recently held that projects that result in the 
destruction of the breeding sites and nests of protected owls could only be allowed if the strict derogatory 
conditions under Article 16 of the Habitats Directive apply.137 The fact that the mitigation strategy 
included the creation of new roosting sites in order to offset the damage did not alter this view. Belgian 
courts have also recently dismissed more flexible approaches towards mitigation.138 The above discussion 
is largely reminiscent of a similar dispute that arose in the context of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive 
regarding the exact qualification of habitat restoration measures connected to project developments that 
encroach upon protected habitats.139 In light of the recent outcome of the Briels proceedings, where the 
Court finally ruled that the creation of new habitats in order to offset the loss of other protected Natura 
2000 habitat should be regarded as compensation only to be taken into consideration within the realm of 
the derogation clause, the aforementioned case-law developments do not appear faulty.140 
Whereas this case law left a bad taste in the mouth of some property developers, it did not manage 
to completely crush the willingness to reach a more strategic and plan-based approach towards species 
conservation, especially in economically important zones, such as port areas. Some Member States 
effectively implemented such practices, in order to obtain better articulation between species protection 
and spatial development and, additionally, to foster proactive conservation and restoration efforts on 
private lands. 
For instance, the 2009 Flemish Species Regulations141 explicitly allow for the establishment of more 
area-oriented species protection programmes, aimed at the introduction of the necessary conservation 
measures for one or more listed species within a certain area which can be qualified as a ‘ecological 
functional unit’. Only just recently, in May 2014, a species protection programme was adopted for the 
Antwerp Port Area by the Flemish government, which specifically aims to create more legal certainty 
for future port development. This is done by implementing a robust set of conservation and restoration 
measures on private lands for the protected species hosted by the Port Area, such as the natterjack toad 
and the common tern.142 In the Netherlands, a similar approach was implemented for the conservation 
and recovery of the natterjack toad in the Dutch Province of Flevoland in 2010.143 However, in contrast 
to the species protection programme for the Antwerp Port Area, the Dutch management plan is 
accompanied by a generic derogation, which releases the individual developers from the burdensome 
derogation procedure. The management plan includes a set of conservation and restoration measures, 
again aimed at the conservation of the species in the area. 
137 See among others: Dutch Council of State, Case no. 201104545/T/T1/A3 (2012). 
138 Schoukens & Cliquet, supra note 63, pp. 208-211. 
139 See for more extensive information on this topic: J. Zijlmans & H. Woldendorp, ‘Compensation and Mitigation: Tinkering with Natura 2000 
Protection Law’, 2014 Utrecht Law Review 10, no. 2, pp. 172-193. 
140 Case 521/12, TC Briels, 2014 not yet published, Paras. 28-33. 
141 Flemish Species Protection Regulation of 15 May 2009, Belgian Official Journal 13 August 2009. 
142 Decision of the Flemish Government of 23 May 2014 (Official Gazette 21 August 2014). For more information on the species protection 
programme, see: <http://www.natuurenbos.be/nl-BE/natuurbeleid/soortenbeleid/bescherming/Soortenbeschermingsprogramma/
SBP%20Antwerpse%20haven> (accessed 30 November 2014). 
143 See for more extensive information: <https://www.flevoland.nl/producten-en-diensten/rugstreeppaddenmanagement/index.xml> 
(accessed 30 November 2014).
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3.3.2. Temporary nature on the rise
The compatibility of these approaches with the EU nature directives remains undecided. Moreover, as 
was the case with the HCPs under the ESA, more flexible approaches toward mitigation can promote 
additional voluntary nature efforts on private lands in the EU. Yet, at best, such measures avoid additional 
losses for nature. 
At present, relatively few instruments in EU and national nature conservation law are targeting 
landowners and project developers who do not necessarily want to develop their lands in the years to 
come. Depending on the available financial resources or the economic climate, such future economic 
developments might only be implemented over the course of ten or twenty years. In some cases, the 
economic use of an industrial land could even be abandoned. 
Alarmed by the recent case law on the strict rules on species protection for EU-protected species, 
many project developers choose to subject these slivers of land to burning, spraying and regular ploughing 
in order to prevent protected species from settling. As a result, hundreds of thousands of acres of lands 
are currently lying unused, merely awaiting their residential, infrastructural or industrial purpose. For 
instance, in the Netherlands it has been reported that almost 40,000 acres of lands are lying temporarily 
vacant every year.144 As a result, many useful opportunities for species conservation and restoration are 
missed, while the survival and recovery of pioneer species such as the natterjack toad and the common 
tern depend on the availability of such pioneer environments. 
In recent years, both in the Netherlands and Belgium, two EU Member States whose territories 
are characterized by a high degree of urban sprawl and urban development, the concept of ‘temporary 
nature’ has emerged. This newly coined concept was used by policy makers to foster nature development 
on lands that have been set aside for future development. Whilst it make take years or, in many cases, 
decades before these slivers of lands are economically developed as industrial estates or housing zones, a 
wider application of temporary nature would allow protected species to thrive there in the meantime. The 
idea is that, even if the project developer or landowner is allowed to remove the species which have settled 
in the meantime, nature will profit from the temporarily available spaces. This was supported by Dutch 
ecological research, which showed that in spite of temporary nature being removed when the relevant 
site is developed it effectively increases the survival chances of many endangered species. Especially 
pioneer species, such as the natterjack toad and the common tern, would benefit from the availability of 
more suitable habitats which are not preemptively managed in order to prevent protected species from 
settling in the first place.145 The large reproduction and dispersion capacity of the pioneer species allows 
them to colonise easily, to quickly form large populations with plenty of offspring able to disperse again. 
More recent Belgian (Flemish) ecological research has also underpinned these conclusions, additionally 
stressing that temporary nature could also be framed in the so-called ‘metapopulation theory’.146 
Meanwhile, temporary nature had already entered the legal scene via the backdoor in both Belgium 
and the Netherlands. In the Flemish Region, the concept gained some early approval from the Belgian 
Council of State, in a case where some sites had been zoned as ‘temporary nature areas’, in order to offset 
the damage that the development of a huge tidal dock would inflict on a Natura 2000 site.147 However, in 
the latter proceedings, the focus was more on mitigation than on temporary nature itself. 
A recent Dutch lawsuit also indirectly touched upon the topic. The proceedings centred on a 
tract of undeveloped land in the Vlissingen Port Area on which a colony of protected spoonbills had 
spontaneously settled in the previous year. A local environmental NGO sought the review of the decision 
of the Dutch Minister competent for the Environment not to classify the site concerned as an SPA, 
thereby referring to the many fears among business people in this regard. The Dutch Council of State 
dismissed the claims, holding that since the five most suitable areas for the spoonbill in the Netherlands, 
144 J. Reker & W. Braakhekke, Beleidslijn Tijdelijke Natuur, 2007. Available at <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/
rapporten/2009/07/15/concept-beleidslijn-tijdelijke-natuur.html> (accessed 30 November 2014).
145 Bureau Stroming, L. Linnartz, Tijdelijke natuur en beschermde soorten: permanente winst. Een ecologische onderbouwing (report 
no. 06.2.1342006), 2006. Available at <http://www.innovatienetwerk.org/nl/bibliotheek/rapporten/5/Tijdelijkenatuurenbeschermde 
soortenpermanentewinsteenecologischeonderbouwing.html> (accessed 30 November 2014). 
146 L. Vriens et al., ‘Advies betreffende de ecologische effecten van tijdelijke natuur’ (INBO.A.2012.168, 2013). 
147 Belgian Council of State, Case no. 166.439 (2007).
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along with six other sites that met the 1%-requirement, had already been designated, the long-term 
protection of the plot of land was unnecessary to reach the good conservation status of the spoonbill.148 
In essence, this ruling could be seen as an implicit endorsement of the concept of ‘temporary nature’ at 
times when the Dutch policy document had not yet been published. 
In spite of the rather favourable treatment of spontaneous cases of nature development on industrial 
estates in some national case law, it soon became apparent that a more comprehensive policy approach 
was needed in order to render the concept attractive for a larger number of landowners and project 
developers, since one could not take the positive outcome of future proceedings as a given.
3.3.3. Toward a clear-cut definition
Without having obtained the certainty that the further economic development of their lands would not 
be hampered by the presence of protected species, temporary nature would never really win the favour 
of many landowners and property developers. In order to overcome the legal uncertainty, the Dutch 
government decided to issue a Policy Document on temporary nature in 2007.149 This was officially 
supported by a motion that had been adopted in the Dutch Parliament in the same year.150 
In the Dutch 2007 Policy Document, the concept of temporary nature is explicitly limited to plots 
of land that have not been accorded a green destination in the applicable zoning plans, such as industrial 
estates or reclamation zones. Another requirement is that the applicable spatial destination is still waiting 
to be realized. Hence the area is only temporarily available for nature development, which preferably 
focuses on the settlement of pioneer species and early species.151 A similar approach is currently being 
drafted in the Flemish Region. In the draft versions of the Flemish Policy Document, it has explicitly 
been stressed that temporary nature must not be used as a replacement for the conservation and/or 
restoration of permanent ecological infrastructure.152 
It can be expected that the baseline population in the context of temporary nature will be mostly zero, 
since the policy explicitly targets vacant plots of land which await the realization of their future economic 
destination. Still, in contrast to the United States, where the SHA approach also explicitly targets privately 
owned farms, ranches and forest lands, this seems to be off the chart for the Dutch and Flemish approach 
towards temporary nature, also because areas with a green destination in the applicable zoning plans are 
excluded. As a result, temporary nature will mainly remain limited to industrial estates, housing zones 
and reclamation areas in the Netherlands and Belgium (Flemish Region). 
Merely establishing a clear-cut definition of the notion of temporary nature would have little effect if 
not coupled with additional measures aimed at providing additional legal certainty for the participating 
landowners. This raised the question on what grounds the final removal of the temporary nature can be 
reconciled with the derogation clauses in EU nature conservation law. 
Interestingly, the solution that was finally opted for was quite similar to the SHA policy in the United 
States described above. In addition to framing temporary nature in a more programmatic approach 
towards species protection, as is for instance partly the case for the Antwerp Port Area, earlier legal 
research had suggested to base the derogations issued for temporary nature on Article 16(1)(a) of the 
Habitats Directive and Article 9(1)(a), second indent, of the Birds Directive. Both provisions allow the 
granting of derogations ‘in the interest of protecting wild flora and fauna and conserving natural habitats’. 
With referral to ecological theory and research, which indicate that temporary nature has a neutral effect 
on all species and a positive effect on some, even if it is removed eventually, such reasoning might hold 
ground.153 Regrettably, the European Commission does not offer a lot of supplementary interpretation on 
this point in its 2007 Guidance document on species protection.154 
148 Dutch Council of State, Case no.200907172/1/R2 (2011). 
149 Reker & Braakhekke, supra note 144. 
150 Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30 690, no. 11. 
151 Reker & Braakhekke, supra note 144, p. 3. 
152 A. Van Kreveld & W. Braakhekke, Voorbereiding op de invoering van het concept tijdelijke natuur. Deelrapport 2 – Natuurtypologie, 2012. 
153 Schoukens, supra note 22, p. 105.
154 European Commission, supra note 72, p. 54.
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Be this as it may, this approach, which heavily relied on the positive benefits that are linked to 
temporary nature, was finally implemented in the 2007 Dutch Policy Document. In this respect, the 
approach towards temporary nature strikingly resembles the SHA concept under the ESA, which was 
also based on an Enhancement of Survival Permit. In order to further encourage the enthusiasm for 
temporary nature, the Policy Document offered the participating landowners to apply for the derogation 
before their plots were made available for the development of temporary nature. Ultimately, the 2007 
Dutch Policy Document decided to qualify the development and subsequent removal of temporary 
nature as ‘one single act’, which can be the subject of an application for derogation well before the removal 
of the nature on the enrolled lands.155 In a worst-case scenario, when the application for a derogation 
is rejected, for instance because the competent authority believes that the suggested site is not suitable 
enough to host protected species in a sustainable way, the landowner could still opt not to let nature 
freely develop on their site. In this approach a choice for temporary nature would make no difference 
whatsoever in terms of future development prospects for the relevant lands. 
As was the case with the 1999 SHA Policy Document in the United States, the 2007 Dutch Policy 
Document also contained several practical guidelines on the procedures and practicalities that need 
to be observed in this context. Most importantly, and in sharp contrast with the SHA approach, no 
strict nature management requirements are to be included in the derogation. Although the participating 
landowners can obviously choose to implement certain management techniques, there is no strict legal 
duty to do so. Additionally, the participating landowners are also required to implement the appropriate 
mitigating measures when removing the species in the context of the realisation of the spatial destination. 
This might entail capturing and relocating the protected species that are left on the enrolled properties. 
Also due regard must be taken of the most vulnerable periods for the protected species that are present 
on the site.156 These requirements are to be seen as a specific implementation of the general due diligence 
obligation, which is enshrined in Dutch nature conservation law. 
3.3.4. First pilots and legal challenges in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands, the solution put forward in the 2007 Policy Document has been put into practice 
by the competent authorities in recent years. Several derogations have been granted allowing for the 
development and subsequent removal of temporary nature on industrial estates, housing zones and port 
areas.157 
One of the first applications concerned a site located in the Port Area of Amsterdam. On 19 February 
2009 the Amsterdam Port Authority filed a formal request with the competent Minister to obtain a 
derogation for a temporary nature project on unused industrial lands in the Port Area. On 15 July 2009 
the Minister granted a derogation for the relevant protected species based on Article 75(5) and (6) of the 
Dutch Law on the Protection of Flora and Fauna. This list of species included the natterjack toad and 
several protected bird species. The derogation was the object of a wide range of stringent conditions, 
in order to mitigate, as much as possible, any avoidable damage to biodiversity when removing the 
temporary nature. 
Soon after, a local Dutch environmental NGO filed a lawsuit against the derogation that was granted 
for the creation and removal of temporary nature on a site in the Port Area of Amsterdam, contesting the 
legality thereof in the light of the EU nature directives and national protection rules. The NGO claimed 
that no derogation could be issued in advance since, at least in the short term, no harmful activities 
were planned. In its view, a request for a derogation from the strict rules on species protection was 
only considered meaningful at the time that the nature is removed. In addition, it was alleged that the 
derogation could not have been based on the interest of ‘protecting wild fauna and flora’, especially in 
the absence of a clear-cut obligation upon the Port Authority to carry out certain management practices. 
The proceedings allowed the Dutch courts to shed light on the compatibility of the ‘temporary nature 
policy’ with the EU nature directives. In its ruling of 27 May 2011, the District Court of Amsterdam 
155 Reker & Braakhekke, supra note 144, pp. 13-14.
156 Ibid., p. 16. 
157 For more information on recent applications of the concept of Temporary Nature in the Netherlands, see: <http://www.innovatienetwerk.
org/nl/concepten/view/38/TijdelijkeNatuur.html> (accessed 30 November 2014). 
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proved willing to accept the legal soundness of the 2007 Policy Document.158 It assumed that providing 
additional legal certainty to the project developers was a necessary prerequisite in order to obtain positive 
net outcomes for nature. In the absence of the possibility to apply for a derogation well in advance of 
the removal of temporary nature, few project developers would be found willing to let protected species 
settle on their lands. Likewise, the legal certainty obtained by the Port Authority could not be qualified 
as mere ‘economic interests’. In addition, the Court emphasised that attaching strict management duties 
to the derogation was not necessary in this case given the fact that the establishment of temporary nature 
would take place spontaneously, without any specific human intervention. Equally, the ecological research 
presented by the Dutch environmental NGO to disprove the ecological benefits of temporary nature was 
rejected by the Court. Although the decision was appealed before the Dutch Council of State, the substantive 
arguments did not need to be addressed a second time as the appeal only concerned submissions that 
were raised by the beneficiary of the derogation.159 While not all possible legal arguments against the 
Dutch approach were addressed in the aforementioned national proceedings, the outcome indicates that, 
when backed up by clear-cut policy documents, national courts tend to reassert the use of a concept like 
temporary nature. In hindsight, this approach, which is strikingly similar to the SHA approach under the 
ESA, appears to be a viable way of offering the necessary assurances to the participating landowners, who 
now ‘know the score’ before starting out with the concept of temporary nature. Obviously, the only court 
competent to provide us with definitive answers on the legal soundness of the approach would be the 
Court of Justice of the EU in Luxemburg. For the time being, however, it appears that the above reasoning 
might hold ground against judicial scrutiny, that is if applied in a strict manner. 
In a letter of 21 February 2014 addressed to the Flemish government, who was also interested in a 
more widespread application of temporary nature, the European Commission seemed to agree with this 
opinion.160 Questioned about potential incompatibilities between temporary nature and the EU nature 
directives, the Commission indicated that, in principle, the premises of temporary nature are compatible 
with the objectives of EU nature conservation law. Acknowledging that temporary nature could serve 
as a useful additional instrument in the attempts to recover the EU’s most endangered species, the 
Commission is also of the opinion that it would probably not interfere with the designation duties for 
Member States in the context of the Natura 2000 Network. That is, as long as a the existing areas are 
sufficiently protected and managed.161 
As far as the reconcilability with Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive is concerned, the Commission 
emphasised that, whilst temporary nature projects cannot be generally exempted from the habitat 
assessment obligation,162 the application of such assessment would not often give rise to insurmountable 
obstacles. It can indeed be expected that the removal of temporary nature, in the vicinity of a Natura 2000 
site, is reconcilable with the substantive requirements of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, whenever 
it is assured that the conservation goals of the site are achieved in the permanently protected core areas 
of the site. Temporary nature being merely an additional effort to spark species restoration efforts on 
privately owned lands therefore will not interfere with a site’s conservation goals. Most importantly, 
the Commission also agreed that ad hoc derogations can be granted for temporary nature projects on 
the basis of Article 16(1)(a) of the Habitats Directive. By doing so, the Commission seemed to reassert 
the above-presented Dutch approach to temporary nature. However, the Commission added that such 
approach would only be justifiable if it could be maintained that, in the absence of such a proactive 
derogatory approach, project developers would indeed opt for proactive avoidance measures aimed at 
preventing protected species from settling on their lands. Be this as it may, the Commission did implicitly 
agree with what had been earlier concluded in literature, namely that, if applied in a reasonable manner, 
temporary nature is not at odds with the EU nature directives.163 
158 Rechtbank Amsterdam 27 May 2011, Stichting Milieucentrum Amsterdam en Haven Amsterdam v. Minister van Economische Zaken, 
Landbouw en Innovatie, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2011:BU4250, JM 2011/136. 
159 Dutch Council of State, Case No. 201107589/1/A3 (2012).
160 Letter from the European Commission, 21 February 2014, FV/fl Ares2014 443595. 
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54
Habitat Restoration on Private Lands in the United States and the EU: Moving from Contestation to Collaboration?
With the first legal challenges against the application of the concept of temporary nature having 
been successfully withstood, the Dutch government was eager to push for an even more wide-scale 
application. A so-called ‘Green Deal’, concluded in 2012 between the competent Minister of the previous 
Dutch government and the relevant actors, including both project developers, port authorities and 
nature conservation organisations, aimed to further bolster the application of temporary nature on the 
ground.164 In the meantime, recent monitoring of a vacant lot of 100 acres on which the concept of 
temporary nature had been applied, revealed that most species indeed benefit from this instrument.165
4. The pros and cons of the safe harbor approach: no panacea for all ills?
This analysis shows that the SHA approach, which emerged in the 1990s in the United States, has 
undeliberately found its way to the Netherlands and Belgium (Flemish Region) in the guise of the 
single-act derogation for temporary nature. It is true, however, that the concept of temporary nature, 
as currently put forward in these two countries, has a narrower material and territorial scope than the 
SHAs that are implemented in the United States. Whilst the latter can also be applied on woodlands and 
farmlands, the former tends to focus on vacant lots that have been accorded an economic destination in 
the applicable zoning plans. Given the sheer size of the areas available in the United States, in comparison 
with countries like the Netherlands and Belgium, one can safely assume that the territorial scope will 
differ substantially. Yet also on other counts the approaches are not similar. Not only will the duration 
of a single-act derogation for temporary nature generally be shorter than most SHAs that are concluded 
under the ESA, the former concept also does not oblige the participating landowners to consider active 
land management actions. Consequently, the additional ecological benefits of temporary nature might be 
more uncertain than habitat restoration that is carried out in the context of a SHA.
That said, both approaches have in common that they depart from the traditional approach toward 
nature protection. Instead of stubbornly clinging to old paradigms, SHAs abandon the ‘command 
and control approach’ by offering additional incentives to species conservation and restoration on 
privately owned lands. By doing so, the above-featured SHA approach, both in the United States and the 
Netherlands and Belgium (Flemish Region), seems capable of silencing part of the criticism regarding the 
prohibitive nature of nature conservation law. The mechanism of SHA, which takes the form of a single-
act derogation in the Netherlands and Belgium (Flemish Region), also commits private landowners to 
do a ‘good deed’ for nature, whilst, at the same time, it commits the government or competent authority 
not to punish them for it.166 
4.1. Strengths and benefits
Before addressing its potential pitfalls and drawbacks, I will first recall the major benefits linked to SHAs. 
A big advantage of the SHA approach is that does not aim to compensate for future loss but merely aims 
at increasing endangered species habitat, either through active measures or by letting nature recover 
on its own.167 Instead of focusing on the offsetting of harmful effects of future developments, SHAs, 
including the recent development of concepts such as temporary nature, proactively encourage private 
landowners to actively engage in the recovery of endangered species.168 
This means that an increased use of SHAs might also take away some of the fuel of the increasing 
opposition against nature conservation law. They could be quoted as a prime example of a more 
collaborative approach toward recovery, which is capable of inducing private nature management efforts, 
without giving in to the demands to further relax the existing protection rules in order to allow more 
leeway for economic developments. Moreover, in contrast to market-based approaches, such as species 
164 Green Deal Tijdelijke Natuur, Staatscourant No. 16772, 16 August 2012.
165 M. Zekhuis & A. de Gelder, Het succes van Tijdelijke Natuur, 2013. Available at <http://www.landschapoverijssel.nl/het-succes-van-tijdelijke-
natuur-monitoringsrapport-vier-jaar-tijdelijke-natuur-eeserwold> (accessed 30 November 2014). 
166 M.J. Bean, ‘Four Sure Ways to Undermine a Good Idea… and Hut Endangered Species’, 1998. Available at <http://www.umich.edu/~esupdate/
library/98.11-12/bean.html> (accessed 30 November 2014). 
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or conservation banking, protected species are not turned into a commodity.169 Also, SHAs do not require 
development-related harm to sustain their existence. The fact that participating landowners may, in the 
end, not exercise their right to economically develop the enrolled properties will probably not affect its 
popularity.
By taking away the fear among landowners for additional restrictions when opting for more 
favourable nature management techniques on their lands, SHAs could open new doors for the recovery 
and reintroduction of endangered species on large acreages of land which traditionally remained off the 
chart for nature management actions. As is mostly the case with ‘bottom-up approaches’, the former are 
better equipped to ensure more tangible effects on the ground. SHAs can take away possible opposition to 
such actions by offering private landowners additional guarantees about so-called baseline responsibilities 
and removing the risk of any additional requirements stemming from the potential settlement of new 
species on their plots of lands. 
Under a SHA, landowners are no longer seen as the subject of protection rules but rather as an equal 
partner at the negotiation table. In the end, it remains their free choice to decide whether or not to enrol 
their lands under a SHA statute or, in the Dutch context, to open up their lands for temporary nature. 
Thus, with SHAs, private landowners are invited to enter negotiations. In exchange for legal certainty 
they might be willing to consider additional actions aimed at combatting habitat fragmentation and 
restoring the habitats of endangered and threatened species. Whereas the traditional ‘command and 
control approach’ of nature conservation law might be sufficient, if properly applied, to achieve a standstill 
in the combat against biodiversity loss, SHAs could be an extra push for nature recovery, along with land 
acquisition by governmental authorities, conservation easements and additional financial incentives for 
conservation. Admittedly, in many cases, where landowners finally choose to exert their right to return 
to the baseline conditions, such benefits may be of a temporary nature. Yet, ultimately, such temporary 
efforts could still prove crucial, especially for the survival of pioneer species whose survival is almost 
exclusively dependent on the availability of vacant plots of land. 
Whereas an increased use of SHAs or temporary nature will not be a panacea for all ills and represents 
only one of the potential incentives for fostering nature conservation efforts among landowners, it holds 
the promise of expanding the range of nature management beyond the confines of the protected lands 
that are currently managed by government and/or nature conservation organizations. By targeting these 
slivers of land that are traditionally hard to bring under the scope of nature conservation law, a more 
widespread application of SHAs, whether under the guise of the ‘temporary nature’-concept or not, might 
prove a useful additional instrument in halting the biodiversity loss both in the United States and the EU. 
4.2. Caveats and limitations
In spite of the potential benefits linked to an increased use of instruments like SHA and temporary 
nature, a few ‘caveats’ are in order. As will be explained below, SHAs might not be the appropriate tool 
for every situation and, in addition, will need to be subjected to certain scrutiny. Concerns about the 
potential unlawfulness of these approaches, for instance in light of the EU nature directives, will not be 
treated here as they have already been extensively dealt with above. 
First and foremost, it is important to downscale expectations linked to the application of concepts 
such as SHAs. While such tools may create more enthusiasm among private landowners to embark on 
nature management, the removal of potential land use restrictions will probably not be sufficient to 
persuade the majority of the targeted landowners to opt for ambitious nature conservation or restoration 
measures on their plots of land. For some landowners, the assurances offered by SHA will succeed in 
sparking nature conservation efforts on their property. Others will probably only be willing to contemplate 
such actions if additional financial incentives are provided.170 This raises the question whether additional 
financial schemes need to be set up in order to increase participation rates in SHAs. Some authors have 
169 See for more extensive information: C.T. Reid, ‘The Privatisation of Biodiversity? Possible New Approaches to Nature Conservation Law in 
the UK’, 2011 Journal of Environmental Law 23, no. 2, pp. 1-29.
170 Bean, supra note 48, p. 210.
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considered this issue and recommend linking compensation schemes to voluntary nature management 
actions on private lands.171 
Rewarding private landowners for active nature management is a current topic in the relevant 
American literature on nature conservation.172 Proponents of more robust compensation programs 
contend that such voluntary programmes would partly eliminate the perverse incentives created by 
the prohibitive nature of nature conservation law.173 Whilst, obviously, a good case might be built for 
providing additional financial incentives for lasting nature management measures on private lands, 
it might be less sensible to do so in the specific case of a SHA. After all, under a SHA, the enrolled 
landowners are allowed to remove the created habitat and thus do away with the additionally created 
benefits for the covered species. However, if it is assumed that SHAs are able to create lasting effects by 
temporarily providing additional patches of habitat, it seems rather sensible to attach additional funding 
for such actions. In fact, without additional funding, only landowners with sufficient means to pay for 
habitat improvements might be interested in considering such actions. Having said this, in a scenario 
where property owners do not have to implement specific management actions, which is true in the 
Netherlands in relation to temporary nature, such financial incentives might be perceived inappropriate. 
Obviously, the persisting scepticism about the genuine ecological benefits of concepts such as SHAs 
and temporary nature cannot be left unaddressed. Regardless of the research referred to above, which 
showed that some of the SHAs in the United States, such as the Aplomado Falcon SHA, have significantly 
contributed to the recovery of some of the targeted species, some environmentalists still doubt the 
ecological soundness of SHAs. The unprepared spectator might find concepts such as temporary nature 
rather unsettling. This was also illustrated by the above-treated Dutch lawsuit against the first pilot 
project. It is worth bearing in mind that the above-examined SHAs in the United States only represent a 
small part of the existing practice. Therefore it remains to be seen whether the positive effects of some of 
them will be long-term. It remains unclear whether the benefits will persist whenever the right to return 
to the baseline conditions is exercised. In light of the limited research on the effects of the long-term 
effects of SHAs and temporary nature, some additional reluctance seems especially justified in cases 
where the baseline is not zero, e.g. in a scenario where the plots of land are not already hosting valuable 
habitats or foraging areas for protected species. In such cases, the risk of net biodiversity loss might 
indeed be looming around the corner. 
In most cases, the setting of a reliable habitat baseline will prove vital for ensuring the effectiveness 
of SHAs.174 Some landowners will probably be eager to set the baseline as low as possible, whereas 
conservationists will try to set it at a higher level, thereby preventing the use of SHAs from leading to 
net reductions for the covered protected species. Such discussions might culminate in a burdensome 
negotiation procedure and create additional disincentives for landowners and project developers that are 
willing to participate in SHAs. Especially when small degraded patches of habitat – that are not currently 
harbouring any protected species – are still present on the site, landowners will be more likely to set the 
baseline conditions at zero before introduction, whereas conservationists will advocate a higher baseline 
conditions. They will try to make sure that a SHA is not abused to create a net loss for biodiversity, 
resulting from the assurance that the remaining habitat slivers on the participating properties can be 
removed. 
A similar discussion may arise in cases where populations are subject to significant natural 
fluctuations, which may possibly lead to unrealistic baseline scenarios. For instance, if the baseline is set 
when the population is strong, this might create an additional burden.175 Conversely, underestimation of 
the population might lead to a negative net outcome for biodiversity. In its 1999 Policy Document, the 
FWS provided more guidelines in this regard. It states, among other things, that the FWS will take into 
account population estimates and, as much as possible, focus on the amount and condition of habitat 
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instead of the number of species present on the enrolled property.176 Even so, the expectation is that 
negotiations about a SHA will need to tackle these issues in more detail and provide more clarity. 
Still, even in cases where no protected species are present on the participating lands, the additional 
net benefits related to the use of concepts such as temporary nature are not always taken for granted 
by everyone. It is true, however, that the above-cited Dutch and Belgian ecological research seems to 
support the alleged net benefits of such instruments. These studies appear to debunk concerns regarding 
the added value of the temporary availability of newly developed, created or restored patches of habitat. 
Still, the question remains whether this refutes all possible counterarguments. For instance, some authors 
have stressed the risk that the plots of lands covered by a SHA could create a so-called ecological trap.177 
Ecological traps can be created when the attractiveness of newly created or restored habitat increases 
disproportionately in relation to its value for survival and reproduction. By preferring falsely attractive 
habitat over existing less-attractive but more qualitative habitat, species might become more vulnerable.178 
Obviously, such effects might also arise in the context of a SHA, where new temporarily available habitats 
are developing, sometimes merely because of the absence of harmful human activities (such as mowing). 
However, it is generally accepted that the risk of creating an additional ecological sink is not significantly 
larger in the context of a SHA than in the context of permanent nature management.179 Moreover, in cases 
of new permanently created ‘bad habitat’, the negative effects might even be exacerbated. Still, with the 
right to return to the baseline conditions established, an additional sink effect could be created. In that 
regard, both in the United States and the Netherlands additional mitigating measures must be observed 
whenever the plot of land is returned to its original conditions. Rescuing and, if possible, relocating the 
remaining protected species to other available habitats, might take away the most adverse effects in some 
respects.
On the whole, the net ecological benefits of the use of SHAs should not be taken as a given. To some 
extent, they will depend on the number of landowners that effectively exercise their right to return to 
the baseline. As far as the Dutch policy in relation to temporary nature is concerned, the expectation 
is that in most cases the industrial estate will actually be constructed eventually. The protected species 
that might have settled on the lands in the meantime will therefore ultimately have to be removed. 
However, in the context of the SHAs under the ESA, some authors hold that SHAs might only be able 
to create lasting effects whenever the landowners refrain from implementing their right to return to 
the baseline conditions.180 In the SHAs in the United States referred to above, apparently none of the 
enrolled landowners had exercised their right to remove the species.181 Obviously, such a scenario might 
also unfold in the context of temporary nature. Also in this respect, it cannot be excluded that some of 
the enrolled industrial estates will not be constructed because of lack of available funds or the persisting 
economic downturn. Be this as it may, the Dutch policy seems to rely less strongly on such scenarios. 
It seems to assume that such scenarios would be exceptional and that, in most instances, nature will 
eventually have to give way to project development. 
In order to avoid negative net effects on protected species, the 1999 Policy Document for SHAs 
included some additional safeguards, which might also prevent the ecological trap scenario mentioned 
above. More in particular, it states that ‘if the Services can reasonably anticipate that a proposed Agreement 
would only redistribute the existing population of a listed species or attract a species from a habitat that 
has provided long-term protection to a habitat without such protection, the Services would not enter into 
an Agreement’.182 In addition, in the situation where a species is so depleted or its habitat so degraded 
that considerable improvement of baseline conditions is necessary to result in a net conservation benefit, 
a SHA might not be appropriate according to the FWS.183 Thus, the FWS, at least in theory, seems to 
176 SHA Policy Document, supra note 114, p. 724.
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underline that SHAs might not be the appropriate solution in all possible situations. By reserving the 
right to focus on the SHAs that are capable of providing the greatest possible net benefits for endangered 
species, the FWS makes it abundantly clear that in some cases, potential negative effects might be reason 
not to enter into a SHA. The Dutch Policy Document lacks such a statement (or any element thereof). This 
is regrettable since, in the framework of temporary nature, the participating landowners are not required 
to carry out active nature management measures. They merely have to let nature take its (natural) course. 
However, the Dutch Policy Document does explicitly underline the specific focus of temporary nature 
on so-called pioneer species.184 This clear focus also has an ecological underpinning since, in the end, 
such species would also disappear due to natural succession on the covered lands. Hence the mere fact 
that the nature will be removed after some years is not likely to create significant adverse effects on the 
pioneer species since this species would also be replaced if no construction were envisaged on the terrain.
At the same time it must also be assured that SHAs are not abused as mitigation for negative 
impairment of biodiversity. SHAs should not be applied as mitigation for future project developments. 
This might occur when SHAs are used when landowners have an immediate intention to develop their 
properties. As stated above, the first SHAs in the United States were agreed in the context of traditional 
HCPs. In other words, some landowners that had the intention to immediately carry out a damaging 
activity were also provided additional guarantees for protected species that might settle on their lands 
in the near future. Some observers noted that the FWS, by agreeing with such a scenario, generated the 
risk of SHAs being increasingly perceived by landowners as part of a mitigation programme.185 In theory, 
there is no reason to object to a landowner’s proposal not only to mitigate for the immediate impairments 
to the environment but also to provide for additional conservation efforts thereafter.186 However, in 
reality, such approach might indeed have a negative impact on the public perception of SHAs since the 
difference between mitigation measures and additional voluntary post-intervention nature conservation 
efforts might not be clear. In some cases ‘double dipping’ might take place. Accordingly, it might be feared 
that landowners will point to the SHA as an argument to keep the scope of the mitigation measures as 
limited as possible. Whilst the competent authorities might be tempted to agree with the landowner’s 
demands, in order to avoid additional conflict and upheaval, the endangered species might be worse off 
in the long run. As a consequence, it is recommendable to limit the use of SHAs to scenarios where no 
immediate ‘removal’ of protected species is involved.187 
Likewise, it also needs to be safeguarded that the measures provided under the SHA go beyond 
what is legally required. If a SHA might simply commit landowners to carrying out activities that they 
are already obliged to take under the existing nature conservation laws, much of its added value would 
be lost. In the context of the EU nature directives, temporary nature could, in theory, also be used as a 
proactive management measure in the context of existing Natura 2000 sites.188 To avoid such ‘double 
dipping’ scenarios, both the current Dutch and the (future) Flemish policy exclude the use of temporary 
nature in the context of existing green areas (such as woodlands) in the zoning plan. Although the 
use of this concept in the context of Natura 2000 sites is not precluded, none of the policy documents 
proclaimed the intention to let these actions contribute to the attainment of the good conservation 
status for the EU’s protected species. Or, to put it differently, the good conservation status will have 
to be achieved by permanent conservation efforts. The conservation actions under the framework of 
temporary nature merely serve as additional efforts, on top of the actions required under EU law. This 
prevents that widespread application of temporary nature would, in the end, lead to a net loss for nature. 
Lastly, it should be highlighted here that, since SHAs aim at creating additional enthusiasm among 
landowners for efforts they are not legally required to take, they should not make the related administrative 
burden overly complicated. Accordingly, some authors point out that the competent authorities should 
be cautious with imposing too many monitoring and reporting requirements on the participating 
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landowners.189 In the Netherlands, the idea has even been launched to issue generic derogations for 
temporary nature projects, thereby even further reducing the administrative burden for participating 
landowners.190 Yet, whilst a complex permit system will obviously deter landowners from opting for 
voluntary conservation efforts, it might still be appropriate to at least provide for some basic regulatory 
rules in this regard. Given the relatively ‘young age’ of SHAs and the lack of reliable data regarding 
the long-term effects of SHAs, sound monitoring seems a defendable option for the first generation of 
SHAs. Moreover, as concluded in earlier research, general exemptions for temporary nature will, in any 
event, be at odds with the strict requirements of the EU nature directives, which insist on an individual 
assessment of the possible adverse effects of a harmful activity on protected species.191 Obviously, this 
should not be interpreted as a plea for regulatory creep, but as a reference to the relevance of some basic 
safeguards as regards SHAs. 
5. Outlook
Current nature conservation laws, which are still mainly based on a traditional ‘command and control 
approach’, are falling short in delivering the much-anticipated rebound for many of the imperilled 
species, on both sides of the Atlantic. Whilst the prohibitive nature of the statutory framework for species 
protection, if tightly observed, might be crucial in the halting of the downward spiral for some protected 
species, it seems inapt to bring many species back to a healthy conservation status. The reasons that 
recovery targets are not being reached are diverse and manifold, ranging from poor enforcement to lack 
of additional funding. The above analysis has shown that one of the main causes is linked to the inability 
of conservation law to convince private landowners to participate in the attempts to recover the most 
endangered and threatened species. Whilst it would be wrong to conclude that conservation law has 
gone astray by focusing on implementing the preventative approach, it has been revealed that, in some 
instances, the vigour of the rules might lead to undesirable outcomes. 
The shocking state of our Planet’s biodiversity does not allow us to disregard active cooperation 
of private landowners in the attempts for recovery. It is therefore rather ironic to note that both in the 
United States and the EU, private landowners and property developers are increasingly eager to opt for 
defensive management strategies on their lands, preemptively removing potential habitats. In the absence 
of protected species, such actions do not always violate the letter of the law. Still, they painfully emphasise 
the perverse incentives which might be fostered by current nature conservation laws. In the past two 
decades, some new incentive mechanisms have been developed in order to bring private landowners 
back to the negotiation table. This paper zoomed in on one of the most remarkable examples of these 
novel incentive mechanisms, being SHAs, and addressed it from a comparative point of view. Having 
been developed under the wings of the ESA, SHAs seem capable of overcoming the perverse incentives 
created by the traditional ‘command and control approach’. SHAs have gained popularity in the United 
States, and a similar policy tool has been developed in the Netherlands and (recently) Belgium (Flemish 
Region), in particular targeting nature development on temporarily vacant industrial lands. In recent 
years, ecological studies have revealed that SHAs might indeed yield important net benefits for some 
endangered and threatened species, underlining its potential for species recovery.
Although the relatively recent date of most SHAs in the United States makes it difficult to draw 
definitive conclusions regarding their long-term effects for protected species, the increasing application 
of such tools holds the promise of a more collaborative approach to nature conservation, expanding its 
scope beyond the ambit of protected areas and ‘classical’ nature reserves. The same can be said about the 
temporary nature policy approach which, to a certain extent, is based on the same premises as SHAs. 
Surely, SHAs are but one of the many incentive-based approaches which might help promote restoration 
efforts on private lands. In addition, whether they will stand the test of time has yet to be seen. Yet, 
in comparison with more market-based tools, such as conservation banking, they do not depend on 
harmful spatial developments in order to be applied. Moreover, in itself the approach does not warrant a 
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relaxation of current nature conservation laws since, under certain conditions, it can be aligned with the 
derogation clauses present in both the ESA and EU nature conservation law. SHAs, if implemented in a 
sensible and reasonable way, might provide additional survival and recovery opportunities for pioneer 
species such as the natterjack toad, without leading to new deadlock scenarios. Of course, this would 
require the competent authorities to ensure that SHAs are not abused as a means to reduce mitigation 
obligations for immediate economic developments. 
In conclusion, SHAs and temporary nature should not be welcomed as the ultimate saviours of our 
Planet’s natural assets. Nor should they be used as justification for weakening the existing regulatory 
framework. One should indeed avoid such innovative regulatory instruments from becoming the 
proverbial red herring – the distraction that draws attention away from the real solution. Still, they might 
offer some additional opportunities for averting the extinction of our most endangered species. In times 
of mass extinction, every single opportunity to restore the habitats of endangered species needs to be 
seized with both hands. ¶
